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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
 
“No Walmart in Chinatown”: Chinatown Community for Equitable Development and the 
Campaign Against the World’s Largest Retailer in Los Angeles Chinatown, 2012-2013 
 
by 
 
Lawrence Chi-Yi Lan 
Master of Arts in Asian American Studies 
University of California, Los Angeles, 2016 
Professor Keith Lujan Camacho, Chair 
 
This thesis documents and analyzes the campaign against Walmart in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
During the campaign, which lasted from March 2012 to September 2013, a broad coalition of 
community groups and organized labor converged to oppose the opening of a Walmart 
Neighborhood Market in Chinatown. Drawing on online and mainstream media accounts, city 
and legal documents, and qualitative interviews with Chinatown activists, this thesis (1) 
examines the media narratives that were constructed around the Chinatown Walmart; (2) reflects 
on the debates and discussions captured in the city and legal archives; and (3) traces the 
formation and evolution of a multiethnic, intergenerational community organization, Chinatown 
Community for Equitable Development (CCED), during the campaign. Through their 
relationships, political vision, and organizing tactics, CCED members attempted to broaden their 
activism at the same time that they built grassroots power in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
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Timeline of “No Walmart in Chinatown” Campaign 
 
February 26, 2012 Walmart confirms plans to open Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles 
Chinatown. 
March 22, 2012 Walmart receives building permits from the Los Angeles City Department 
of Building and Safety. 
March 23, 2012 Councilmember Ed Reyes introduces motion to draft an interim control 
ordinance (ICO) that would temporarily prohibit permits for new formula 
retail uses (i.e., big-box retailers) in Los Angeles Chinatown. City Council 
unanimously approves the motion. 
June 30, 2012 LA County Fed organizes community-labor rally and “March on 
Chinatown” against Walmart. Thousands of protestors show up. 
July 3, 2012 APALA and UFCW file lawsuit against the city in a legal challenge, 
Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al. 
July 12, 2012 Los Angeles City Planning Commission votes 5-2 to disapprove ICO. 
August 14, 2012 Planning and Land Use Management Committee votes 2-1 on ICO. 
December 9, 2012 CCED hosts first ever Chinatown “Cash Mob” event that brings people to 
shop at various small businesses in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
January 11, 2013 CCED members begin holding “Friday night vigils”—weekly, anti-
Walmart demonstrations at the corner of Cesar Chavez Avenue and Grand 
Avenue in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
February 8, 2013 CCED hosts Lunar New Year action at the site of Walmart Neighborhood 
Market in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
February 21, 2013 CCED hosts Chinatown Candidates Forum at Alpine Recreation Center 
featuring contenders for the Los Angeles City Council District 1 seat—Gil 
Cedillo, Jose Gardea, Jesse Rosas, and William Morrison. 
May 10, 2013 CCED holds solidarity vigil in support of Bangladeshi garment workers, 
in the wake of the April 24, 2013, Rana Plaza building collapse that killed 
over 1,000 workers in Dhaka, Bangladesh. 
June 2013 CCED begins supporting residents of the Rowland Heights Mobile Estates 
who are organizing in response to harassment by the management. 
June 30, 2013 CCED hosts its first anniversary celebration dinner at Golden Dragon 
Restaurant in Los Angeles Chinatown.  
July 19, 2013 CCED launches “The Streets Between Us: A Snapshot of Chinatown,” a 
photography exhibit featuring the lives of Chinatown community 
members, at the Chinese American Museum. (The exhibit remains on 
display at CAM through September 19, 2013.) 
July 31 — 
August 2, 2013 
CCED members participate in first national gathering of Grassroots APIs 
Rising for Racial Justice in New Orleans, LA. 
September 13, 2013 CCED, LAANE, and allies hold a morning rally at the soft opening of the 
 viii 
Walmart Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
September 19, 2013 Hundreds of people show up to demonstrate at the grand opening of the 
Walmart Neighborhood Market in Chinatown. 
October 27, 2013 CCED hosts an open house at its new office location, Kleverdog Co-
Working on Bamboo Lane, in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
November 7, 2013 Walmart workers coordinate largest civil disobedience in Walmart history 
outside the Walmart Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
January 17, 2016 Walmart Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles Chinatown closes after it 
makes a public announcement with two days’ notice. The Chinatown store 
is 1 of 9 stores statewide, 154 stores nationally, and 269 stores around the 
world whose closures Walmart announces on January 15. 
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Introduction 
Los Angeles Chinatown, the “No Walmart in Chinatown” Campaign, and Chinatown 
Community for Equitable Development 
 
 “No Walmart in Chinatown!” 
The explanatory power of this slogan holds a good deal of meaning, specifically in terms 
of what it portended before the 2012-2013 campaign against a proposed Walmart in Chinatown 
officially coalesced, what it meant during the campaign, and what it means in retrospect, given 
that there is no more Walmart in Chinatown. On January 17, 2016, the Wal-Mart Neighborhood 
Market on Cesar Chavez Avenue in Los Angeles Chinatown shuttered its doors to the public 
without much ado. The store’s closing marked a comparatively quiet end to a much-contested, 
locally-rooted struggle to keep the Wal-Mart from opening. Less than two and a half years 
earlier, on September 13, 2013, activists, community members, and local and regional 
stakeholders had welcomed the Wal-Mart Neighborhood Market with a direct action on the 
morning of its grand opening. The local campaign against the Wal-Mart’s entry into Los Angeles 
Chinatown had lasted over a year and had witnessed the creation of a new local community 
group, Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED), made up of activists and 
stakeholders—including residents and small business owners—in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
Though the organization’s formation coalesced around the campaign against Wal-Mart, the 
community activism that emerged in 2012 and 2013 represented a symbolic stand for 
community-driven change in Los Angeles Chinatown rather than corporate-driven development. 
In that sense, the grassroots community organizing that emerged in response to the Wal-Mart can 
be read at a broader scale as a response to the specter of corporate-driven development that Wal-
Mart symbolized, and the concomitant gentrification that it potentially augured for Los Angeles 
Chinatown. 
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This thesis analyzes a case of community organizing in Los Angeles Chinatown as a 
response to the neoliberal state’s escalation of devolution, deregulation, and privatization in 
recent years, using insights provided by social movement theory, urban geography, and political 
economy to better understand place-specific struggles in Los Angeles. Specifically, this thesis 
focuses on a community organization, Chinatown Community for Equitable Development 
(CCED), as a case study for place-based grassroots organizing, looking at how CCED practices 
various forms of scalar mobilizations, specifically against Walmart in 2012 and 2013. Based in 
Los Angeles Chinatown, the multiethnic, multiracial, and multi-generational CCED is an 
unincorporated volunteer organization that supports low-income and immigrant communities in 
Los Angeles Chinatown.  
The existing literature in geography primarily understands gentrification to be “nothing 
more and nothing less than the neighborhood expression of class inequality.”1 While this class 
analysis is significant, race also figures prominently into gentrification—especially in a city like 
Los Angeles, where processes of racialization have dictated material and spatial constraints on 
communities of color. In addition to developing a geographical perspective that scholars like 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Laura Pulido, George Lipsitz, and Clement Lai have brought to Ethnic 
Studies literature, this thesis explores how grassroots organizing and mobilization in CCED have 
drawn an intergenerational array of people into a progressive or left politics.2 More specifically, 
a theoretical contribution of my thesis expands upon recent scholarship that brings Marxist 
                                                
1 Loretta Lees, Tom Slater, and Elvin Wyly, Gentrification (New York: Routledge, 2008), 80. 
 
2 Ruth Wilson Gilmore, Golden Gulag: Prisons, Surplus, Crisis, and Opposition in Globalizing 
California. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2007); Laura Pulido, Black, Brown, Yellow and 
Left: Radical Activism in Los Angeles (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2006); Clement Lai, 
“The Racial Triangulation of Space: The Case of Urban Renewal in San Francisco’s Fillmore District,” 
Annals of the Association of American Geographers 102, no. 1 (2012): 151-170; George Lipsitz, How 
Racism Takes Place (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 2011). 
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human geography into further conversation with Ethnic Studies.3 Furthermore, this thesis 
explores how CCED has incorporated notions of place, land use, and equitable development into 
their anti-gentrification organizing strategy. This project likewise extends the research that 
Sophia Cheng has done on Chinatown organizing, as well as adds to Angie Chung’s notion of 
“geoethnic bridging organizations” as that which strengthen multiethnic, multiracial relationships 
in a rapidly changing global city.4 
This thesis on Los Angeles Chinatown is significant to Asian American Studies 
specifically, and to Ethnic Studies in general. First, it contributes toward a broad political 
economic analysis of the recent development of Los Angeles Chinatown, especially in the years 
since Governor Jerry Brown’s dissolution of the Los Angeles Community Redevelopment 
Agency in 2011. Second, the spate of private developers moving into Chinatown and nearby 
Echo Park and Boyle Heights underscores the importance of a comparative ethnic studies 
approach, and a spatial analysis, to the current wave of development. Activist organizations like 
CCED consciously engage in scalar strategies to build more sustainable and large-scale 
movement. Therefore, I ground my interdisciplinary research project in Ethnic Studies, which 
has a historical commitment to serving the community, in order to think through the specific 
questions of my research in Chinatown and also the broader question of how to connect Ethnic 
Studies units to the various formations of community activism that are happening on the ground. 
 
                                                
3 In thinking about Marxist human geographers, I am specifically considering the work of Neil Smith, 
Doreen Massey, and David Harvey. See Neil Smith, “New Globalism, New Urbanism: Gentrification as 
Global Urban Strategy,” Antipode 34, no. 3 (2002): 427-450; Doreen Massey, For Space (London: SAGE 
Publications, 2005); David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2005). 
 
4 Sophia Cheng, “Community Organizing in Los Angeles Chinatown: Historical Case Study of the 
Cornfields,” MA thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 2013; Angie Chung, Legacies of Struggle: 
Conflict and Cooperation in Korean American Politics (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007). 
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Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical framework of this thesis rests on three primary themes: (1) the mutually 
constitutive nature of race and space; (2) the relational nature of racialization processes; and (3) 
the complex entanglements of race, gender, political economy, and geography in Los Angeles. 
By exploring each of these ideas with respect to Los Angeles Chinatown, this thesis situates Los 
Angeles Chinatown as a local site of contemporary grassroots place-based organizing and also as 
a case study of how race and gender operate in a multiethnic, multiracial spatial context. This 
thesis engages critical geographical conceptualizations of space, racial formation theory, and 
critical race theory in order to expand on the existing scholarly conversations between geography 
and ethnic studies. In engaging various disciplines and expressing a clear commitment to 
community activism, my research project theoretically positions itself within Critical Ethnic 
Studies, which has as its central goal the development of “an approach to scholarship, institution 
building, and activism animated by the spirit of the decolonial, antiracist, and other global 
liberationist movements that enabled the creation of Ethnic Studies, and which continues to 
inform its political and intellectual projects.”5 
Though I draw from the theoretical and methodological insights of various disciplines, I 
ground this thesis, too, in the commitment of Ethnic Studies to serving communities in material 
ways—that is, finding and making clear linkages between research and action/advocacy 
outcomes. In an article that demonstrates a strong relationship between policy advocacy and 
research, sociologist Lynn Fujiwara takes on the ways in which immigration discourse and social 
welfare policy discourse converged in the 1990s at the contested sites of Asian immigrant 
mothers and their children. Fujiwara argues that the welfare reform policies that emerged from 
                                                
5 “About,” Critical Ethnic Studies Association, accessed April 15, 2015, 
https://www.criticalethnicstudies.org/content/about. 
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that historical moment in the 1990s demonized and disproportionately hurt Asian immigrant 
women and their children.6 In the context of a neoliberal state that has retracted its policy 
responsibilities in a show of devolution and privatization—a phenomenon that geographers have 
referred to as “dumping scale”—Fujiwara invokes Stuart Hall and David Held’s notion of a 
“politics of closure,” analyzing the ways in which differential citizenship is used to exclude 
certain groups from civic participation.7 To that end, I situate the development happening today 
in Los Angeles Chinatown in the broader ideological, discursive contexts around gentrification 
(or perhaps more precisely, neoliberal urban revitalization). As Fujiwara’s work does, this thesis 
makes clear the relationship between the discourse around neoliberal conceptions of 
‘revitalization’ and the lives of low-income people of color and small business owners living and 
working in Chinatown. By conveying the stories of the majority low-income immigrant 
population living in Chinatown and by trying to understand the macro-level context in which all 
of this is happening, my thesis project borrows from Fujiwara’s methodological approach. 
Moreover, as a member of Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED), 
an activist organization building power with low-income immigrants and workers in Chinatown, 
I have a clear political stake in my research. Ultimately, I hope to find a way to turn my research 
into actionable lessons for community organizing that can improve the lives of people living in 
Chinatown. While I hope to convey the voices of my interlocutors in my project, I understand the 
ways in which these voices will be filtered through my own motivations, agendas, and stakes in 
this research given my positionality as an activist. 
                                                
6 Lynn Fujiwara, “Mothers Without Citizenship: Asian Immigrants and Refugees Negotiate Poverty and 
Hunger after Welfare Reform,” in Contemporary Asian America: A Multidisciplinary Reader, 2nd ed., ed. 
Min Zhou and J. V. Gatewood (New York: New York University Press, 2007). 
 
7 Fujiwara, “Mothers Without Citizenship,” 282. 
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Taking inspiration from Fujiwara, I interviewed members of the community organization, 
Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED), to gain insight into the history of 
progressive organizing in Los Angeles Chinatown and to better contextualize the founding of 
CCED at a specific historical moment. My interviews with CCED members provide the context 
for understanding how Los Angeles Chinatown has changed with the presence of CCED, and 
how CCED has evolved with the Chinatown community. These interviewees were recruited for 
this project using a combination of my own contacts in the organization, CCED, and snowball 
sampling to find others to interview. 
Another concept at the core of my thesis project is the spatiality of race and the ways in 
which the geographies of Los Angeles are informed by structures of access, power, and racial 
inequity.8 In this way, my project’s conceptual approach draws from the work of Laura Pulido to 
incorporate the ways in which race is (re)produced spatially in the uneven urban development of 
Los Angeles. Furthermore, this project borrows from Clement Lai’s application of Claire Kim’s 
work on racial triangulation and relational racial positioning to “analyze urban renewal as a case 
of spatialized racial triangulation.”9 This theoretical approach frames my project’s discursive 
analysis of how Los Angeles Chinatown as an urban space has been and continues to be 
racialized in relation to surrounding downtown neighborhoods and even in relation to the 
Chinese ethnoburbs of the San Gabriel Valley.10 The key research questions are as follows: How 
are changes in capitalism and changes in the state influencing the changes in American cities, 
                                                
8 Laura Pulido, “Rethinking Environmental Racism: White Privilege and Urban Development in Southern 
California,” Annals of the Association of American Geographers 90, no. 1 (2000): 12-40; Lai, “The 
Racial Triangulation of Space”; Lipsitz, How Racsm Takes Place. 
 
9 Lai, “The Racial Triangulation of Space,” 153. 
 
10 Wei Li, Ethnoburb: The New Ethnic Community in Urban America (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i 
Press, 2009). 
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especially in the city of Los Angeles and Los Angeles Chinatown? What does power mean for 
low income, immigrant communities fighting gentrification? How can Ethnic Studies serve the 
people in the current historical moment? And how can we imagine the possibilities for a closer 
community-university relationship? 
 
Research Design & Methodology 
Space is just as much about the people who reside in it or use it and the activities they do 
in relation to space. As Caroline Knowles notes, space is “an active archive of the social 
processes and social relationships composing racial orders.”11 Accordingly, this thesis employs 
methods in part to expand on extant ethnographic research to explore the various processes of 
race making in and around Los Angeles Chinatown. There are two primary methodological 
components to this proposed thesis research project: (1) ethnographic interviews with Chinatown 
activists and residents and (2) an analysis of city planning documents and media accounts related 
to the Wal-Mart Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles Chinatown during 2012 and 2013. 
Between April 2016 and May 2016, I interviewed thirteen Chinatown activists, all 
members of CCED. They ranged from ages 18 to 70 from a variety of backgrounds, primarily 
Chinese/Chinese American by way of Vietnam, Cambodia, mainland China, and Taiwan. 
Interviews with activists in Chinatown prove significant to my research. In their overview of 
contemporary Asian immigration patterns to and spatial settlement patterns within the United 
States, Min Zhou and James Gatewood advocate for re-conceptualizing contemporary 
immigration not simply as a byproduct of the 1965 Hart-Cellar Act. They assert that immigration 
additionally entails “the effects of globalization, uneven political and economic developments in 
developing and developed countries, the social processes of international migration, and the role 
                                                
11 Caroline Knowles, Race and Social Analysis (London: SAGE Publications, 2003), 80. 
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of the United States in world affairs.”12 While Zhou and Gatewood present a satisfactory 
overview of the diversity of Asian Americans and Pacific Islanders, their statistical narratives—
while very useful—do not reflect the level of community engagement that I want out of my own 
research. I do not wish to diminish the statistical context of Chinatown, in which 94 percent of 
residents are renters, making them particularly vulnerable to predatory rent increases. However, I 
want to explore the subjectivities of the people living and working in Chinatown in a way that 
supplements these statistical narratives.13 
Yet the scope of this thesis does not include substantive interviews with other Chinatown 
stakeholders beyond CCED members. This restricted focus is a limitation and perhaps an 
opportunity for future research in Los Angeles Chinatown. Thinking about other Chinatown 
stakeholders to interview cannot be overstated, inasmuch as interviews with only activists who 
are engaged in anti-gentrification work may not provide enough context to understand the 
complex dynamics of development in Chinatown. In her work on call center workers in India, 
sociologist Kiran Mirchandani focuses on the practices of globalization in order (1) to highlight 
“the active ways in which workers define and construct their work situations” and (2) to shed 
light on the “cracks” and inconsistencies of global capitalism and reveal “opportunities for 
political resistance,” in Mirchandani’s words.14 I draw from Mirchandani’s deliberate eschewing 
of “trade agreements, state policies and corporate structures” in favor of localized experiences 
                                                
12 Min Zhou and J. V. Gatewood, “Transforming Asian America: Globalization and Contemporary 
Immigration to the United States,” in Contemporary Asian America: A Multidisciplinary Reader, 2nd ed., 
ed. Min Zhou and J. V. Gatewood (New York: New York University Press, 2007), 119. 
 
13 Randy Mai and Bonnie Chen, The State of Chinatown Los Angeles (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian 
American Studies Center, May 2013). 
 
14 Kiran Mirchandani, “Practices of Global Capital: Gaps, Cracks and Ironies in Transnational Call 
Centres in India,” Global Networks 4, no. 4 (2004): 357. 
 9 
and practices of the very people working in transnational call centers.15 Mirchandani’s 
methodological insights can be applied to my own research in Los Angeles Chinatown. For 
example, Mirchandani makes sure to interview not only call center workers, but also managers 
and training agency representatives in order to provide a relatively comprehensive analysis of 
call center workers. Given the diverse array of stakeholders, future research could carefully the 
position of other Chinatown stakeholders (e.g., Chamber of Commerce members, business 
owners like Roy Choi and Andy Ricker, local business elite, benevolent association members) 
while still maintaining the residents of Chinatown as a center of gravity. 
 
Chapter Overview 
Given the valuable insights that media analysis provides, I incorporate media analysis in 
Chapter One. To contextualize the campaign against the Walmart Neighborhood Market in Los 
Angeles Chinatown, I examine various online media outlets writing about the proposed Walmart 
in Los Angeles Chinatown as well as mainstream media (e.g., Los Angeles Times) accounts of 
the issue. In his work on neoliberalism in New York City and its “violent remapping of lives, 
bodies, and desires of queers of color,” Martin Manalansan demonstrates the powerful ways that 
media analysis can be brought to bear on discourses around urban space.16 In his “triangulated 
exploration of space, race, and queerness,” Manalansan uses media analysis to expose the 
discursive making of Jackson Heights as “the new exotic gay mecca…not a space but a 
commodity to be consumed and literally eaten up for people who will spend a few hours being 
                                                
15 Ibid. 
 
16 Martin Manalansan, “Race, Violence, and Neoliberal Spatial Politics in the Global City,” Social Text 
23, no. 3-4 (2005), 141. 
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temporary gay tourists.”17 Similarly, I analyze mainstream media accounts of Los Angeles 
Chinatown—much of which focuses on foodie culture and Chinatown as a culinary/consumptive 
space in the wake of neoliberal revitalization—in order to argue that the media accounts of the 
Chinatown Walmart sometimes limited the scope of the struggle. In revealing the constraints that 
the media narratives sometimes imposed on the Chinatown Walmart campaign, I offer some 
context to discuss the community organizing against the Walmart and situate this activism in the 
contemporary context of gentrification and development.18  I suspect that, much like Manalansan 
argues, neoliberal practices have shaped the lives of poor immigrants in Chinatown in distinct 
ways reflected in the media discourse. 
In Chapter Two, I examine official Los Angeles City documents around the passage of an 
interim control ordinance to ban big-box retailers in Chinatown, City planning documents 
regarding a challenge to Walmart’s building permits, and selected documents from the legal 
attempts to obtain an injunction against the Chinatown Walmart to argue that these archives 
present a distinctly limited narrative of the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign. 
Analyzing the qualitative interviews with CCED members, I explore in Chapter Three the 
ways that contemporary community organizing takes local form in Los Angeles Chinatown, 
particularly in the case of the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign. In relying on ethnographic 
research, I incorporate Lane Hirabayashi’s recent reflections on mutuality in research, through 
which engaged scholars reconcile their shared identities as researcher and subject and ensure that 
                                                
17 Manalansan, “Race, Space, and Neoliberal Spatial Politics,” 147. 
 
18 For one such example (of many), see Jonathan Gold, “Chinatown emerging as L.A.’s hottest restaurant 
destination,” Los Angeles Times, January 16, 2015. 
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their research is produced with communities.19 As a participant-subject in CCED and its ongoing 
anti-gentrification work in Chinatown, concerns around mutuality and insider/outsider research 
are pertinent. 
 At a time when Los Angeles is becoming increasingly multiethnic, multiracial, and multi-
class in the context of neoliberalism, Asian Americans and other people of color continue to 
organize to preserve historic neighborhoods and prevent the displacement of longtime residents. 
Post-recession development is quickly escalating the stakes in racialized and economically 
vulnerable communities like Los Angeles Chinatown. In this thesis, I illuminate the discursive 
processes that informed the media narratives during the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign, 
evaluate the extent to which the city and legal archives documented one dimension of the 
campaign, and trace the formation and evolution of CCED. Through their relationships, political 
vision, and organizing tactics, CCED members attempted to broaden their activism at the same 
time that they built grassroots power in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
 
                                                
19 Lane Ryo Hirabayashi, “Thinking About and Experiencing Mutuality: Notes on a Son’s Formation,” in 
Mutuality: Anthropology’s Changing Terms of Engagement, ed. Roger Sanjek (Philadelphia: University 
of Pennsylavania Press, 2015), 118-129. 
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Chapter One 
The Communications Blast Radius of the World’s Largest Retailer in Los Angeles Chinatown20 
 
The community response is clear and we look forward to serving residents here for years 
and years to come.21 
—Steven V. Restivo, senior director of community affairs, Walmart 
 
How might we read the partial histories of media accounts? What kind of explanatory 
power do they have over the past, present, and future—and what do they reveal about a particular 
historical moment? Conversely, what are the explanatory limitations of these partial media 
histories? This chapter considers these questions in relation to the production of media narratives 
from February 2012, when news of Walmart moving into Chinatown became public, to 
September 2013, when the Chinatown Walmart store opened. From the start, mainstream and 
independent media outlets alike understood there would be a struggle over the Chinatown 
Walmart, especially given the history of Walmart’s attempts to gain access to the Los Angeles 
City market in the past decade.22 This chapter examines the narratives that gradually emerged in 
2012 and 2013 around the Chinatown Walmart and the support and opposition it received from 
various stakeholders throughout Los Angeles. I argue that the mainstream media narratives 
attempted to do what Joseph Nevins has characterized as “privatizing” a conflict; more 
                                                
20 For more on Walmart’s size, growth, and role in the U.S. economy, see Emek Basker, “The Causes and 
Consequences of Wal-Mart’s Growth,” Journal of Economic Perspectives 21, no. 3 (Summer 2007): 177-
198. 
 
21 Steven V. Restivo, quoted in Tiffany Hsu, “Wal-Mart Neighborhood Market opens in Chinatown,” Los 
Angeles Times, September 13, 2013, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-mo-walmart-neighborhood-
market-chinatown-20130913-story.html.  
 
22 Patt Morrison, “Walmart faces fight as it plans first store in downtown L.A.,” February 27, 2012, 
http://www.scpr.org/programs/patt-morrison/2012/02/27/22689/wal-mart-to-build-grocery-store-in-
chinatown/. See also Sonali Kolhatkar, “Walmart Pushes for First New Store in LA in a Decade—
Activists Push Back,” Uprising Radio, March 16, 2012, accessed April 26, 2016, 
http://uprisingradio.org/home/2012/03/16/walmart-pushes-for-first-new-store-in-la-in-a-decade-activists-
push-back/. For a scholarly legal case study of Walmart’s efforts to open up shop in Inglewood in the 
early to mid-2000s, see Scott L. Cummings, “Law in the Labor Movement’s Challenge to Wal-Mart: A 
Case Study of the Inglewood Site Fight,” California Law Review 95, no. 5 (October 2007): 1927-1998.  
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specifically, by rhetorically containing the issue of the Walmart in Chinatown within certain 
legal parameters, mainstream media attempted to restrict and limit the scope of the Chinatown 
Walmart struggle—a tactic that some scholars have characterized as “dumping scale.”23 On the 
other hand, as I will demonstrate, the various people and groups opposed to the Chinatown 
Walmart attempted to broaden the scope of the struggle to include Los Angeles Chinatown while 
making connections to anti-Walmart struggles in other places.  
In this chapter, I also attempt to expose the dominant economic common sense—one 
grounded in neoliberal thought that supports privatization and “free-market competition”—that 
the media narratives intentionally or unintentionally permitted and reproduced. In perpetuating 
this economic mode of thought, the dominant media narratives help to bolster what sociologist 
Moon-Kie Jung has called “a racial logic that devalues the suffering, indeed the lives, of certain 
categories of people.”24 In the context of this thesis, the mainstream media narratives espouse a 
pervasive narrative of economic common sense that comes at the expense of considering the 
lives and livelihoods of Chinatown residents and small businesses. 
 
Media Coverage of the Chinatown Walmart 
In this section, I discuss the media coverage of the Chinatown Walmart. Special attention 
is paid to the ways in which dominant media outlets like the Los Angeles Times and smaller, 
independent online news outlets generated narratives in the period leading up to the opening of 
                                                
23 Joseph Nevins, “Contesting the Boundaries of International Justice: State Counter-Mapping and 
Offshore Resource Struggles Between East Timor and Australia,” Economic Geography 40, no. 1 (2004): 
13; for more on the idea of dumping spatial scale, see Clement Lai, “Between ‘Blight’ and a New World: 
Urban Renewal, Political Mobilization, and the Production of Spatial Scale,” ISSI Fellows Working 
Papers, Institute for the Study of Social Change (University of California, Berkeley: Institute for the 
Study of Societal Issues, 2006), 3.  
 
24 Moon-Kie Jung, Beneath the Surface of White Supremacy: Denaturalizing U.S. Racisms Past and 
Present (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015), 19. 
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the Chinatown Walmart in September 2013.25 How did the media accounts of the Chinatown 
Walmart differ, and what do those differences reveal about the representations of Chinatown, 
Walmart, and other stakeholders? The news media did not simply present events as they 
happened; they constructed specific representations of Chinatown, Walmart, and the people who 
supported and opposed the entry of Walmart into Chinatown. For example, the first news of 
Walmart’s plans to open a store in Chinatown appeared in February 24, 2012.26 Within a day of 
this announcement, media outlets had confirmed with city government officials that the giant 
retailer had filed permit applications with the Los Angeles City Department of Building and 
Safety in late 2011.27 By that time, Walmart’s senior director of communications, Steven 
Restivo, had also formally announced their plans to open a Neighborhood Market in Chinatown 
with major media outlets; Restivo had likewise sought to pre-empt early opposing arguments by 
justifying Walmart’s decision to open in Chinatown.28 Restivo upheld the company’s decision in 
a message that went out to several mainstream news outlets in Los Angeles: 
                                                
25 For the source of inspiration for my analysis of media narratives and representations, see William 
Edward Gow, “I Went to the Protest and All I Got Was This Lousy T-Shirt: Media Representations, 
Sweatshops, and the Abercrombie & Fitch Controversy” (MA thesis, University of California, Los 
Angeles, 2003). 
 
26 New of Walmart’s plans to open up a Neighborhood Market location in Chinatown came out on 
February 24-25, 2016. See “Breaking News: Walmart Trying to Open First LA Grocery Store, Major 
Fight Looms,” Capital and Main, February 24, 2012, http://capitalandmain.com/latest-news/issues/labor-
and-economy/breaking-news-walmart-trying-to-open-first-la-grocery-store-major-fight-looms/; “Wal-
Mart plans to open grocery store in L.A.’s Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, February 25, 2012, accessed 
April 25, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/02/wal-mart-chinatown-market.html; and 
Jacquelyn Ryan, “Wal-Mart to Put Grocery in Downtown L.A.,” Los Angeles Business Journal, February 
24, 2012, accessed April 25, 2016, http://www.labusinessjournal.com/news/2012/feb/24/wal-mart-put-
grocery-downtown-l/. 
 
27 “Breaking News: Walmart Trying to Open First LA Grocery Store, Major Fight Looms,” Capital and 
Main, February 24, 2012, http://capitalandmain.com/latest-news/issues/labor-and-economy/breaking-
news-walmart-trying-to-open-first-la-grocery-store-major-fight-looms/. 
 
28 Dennis Romero, “Walmart Aiming For Chinatown in a Los Angeles Hostile to This Big-Box Retailer,” 
LA Weekly, February 25, 2012, http://www.laweekly.com/news/walmart-aiming-for-chinatown-in-a-los-
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We're finding that the more people learn FACTS [sic] about the company, the more they 
see the value in brining [sic] a Walmart store to their community. For example, our 
wages and benefits are competitive with a majority of our California competitors and our 
stores are often magnets for growth and development. We’re proud of the contributions 
we make in communities across the country - from creating jobs and generating tax 
revenue to helping customers save and contributing to local non-profits - and look 
forward to engaging with downtown residents to listen, answer questions and share 
information about our company. 
Our new Walmart Neighborhood Market will serve as a new option for customers 
who want access to a broad assortment of affordable groceries. Plus, the opportunity to 
revive the vacant property is in line with our sustainability goals and will help deliver an 
added economic boost to the area. We expect to start work this summer.29 
Restivo cited the Walmart decision to move into Chinatown as one that served customers who 
wanted to see “a broad assortment of affordable groceries,” without specifically explaining what 
constituted affordability and who the Walmart’s intended customers were. He added that by 
reviving the previously empty property on Cesar Chavez Avenue Walmart would boost the area 
economically. Restivo’s use of the allure of economic benefits like job growth, tax revenue, and 
contributions to non-profits around “the communities across the country” rhetorically allows 
Restivo to pivot to the “FACTS [sic]” of the Chinatown location. These “facts” included the 
need in Chinatown for affordable groceries, implying that existing Chinatown businesses did not 
                                                                                                                                                       
angeles-hostile-to-this-big-box-retailer-2398269; Walmart spokesperson Steven Restivo also emailed the 
identical message to other mainstream media outlets in Los Angeles, including the LAist. Lauren Lloyd, 
“Coming to Chinatown: L.A. County’s First Wal-mart Grocery,” LAist, February 25, 2012, accessed July 
3, 2016, http://laist.com/2012/02/25/coming_to_chinatown_wal-mart_grocery.php.  
 
29 Steven Restivo, quoted in Romero, “Walmart Aiming For Chinatown in a Los Angeles Hostile to This 
Big-Box Retailer,” LA Weekly, February 25, 2012. 
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fulfill that need and proposing that Walmart’s occupation of the vacant property would address 
such an urgent economic need in the community. 
Understanding the demography of Los Angeles Chinatown is helpful for understanding 
better the context in which Restivo’s remarks emerge. Socioeconomically, Los Angeles 
Chinatown is an area characterized by concentrated poverty. The household median income in 
Chinatown is $19,500, which falls drastically below the Los Angeles County household median 
income of $56,000.30 The demographic landscape of Chinatown reveals that immigrants make up 
a majority (91 percent) of the Chinatown population. Additionally, 94 percent of the immigrant 
population in Chinatown speaks a language other than English; 89 percent of the immigrant 
population speaks English less than “very well,” indicating the significant language barrier that 
exists for many of the immigrants who live in Chinatown.31 Furthermore, housing data shows 
that renters make up 94% of Los Angeles Chinatown.32 The limited English proficiency of a 
majority of the population also indicates that many may not have access to in-language 
information regarding their rights as workers and tenants.33 Taken together, the majority renter 
status and low socioeconomic level of Chinatown residents reveal a majority low-income 
Chinatown population that is largely economically vulnerable to rent increases. 
Restivo’s remarks construct in Los Angeles Chinatown the image of a neighborhood in 
need of economic assistance and access to affordable groceries; his remarks aligned the proposed 
Chinatown Walmart with the aims of a Walmart initiative started in 2011 that sought to prioritize 
                                                
30 Randy Mai and Bonnie Chen, The State of Chinatown Los Angeles (Los Angeles: UCLA Asian 
American Studies Center, May 2013), 11. 
 
31 Ibid., 9. 
 
32 Ibid., 15. 
 
33 Ibid. 
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healthy foods and to “address food deserts by building stores in underserved communities that 
are in need of fresh and affordable groceries.”34 Significantly, at the time of Restivo’s comments 
in 2012, Los Angeles Chinatown was home to at least one full-service grocery store and many 
smaller grocery stores that carried groceries and produce.35 To combat the narrative that 
Chinatown was a food desert in need of “affordable groceries,” CCED created a flyer that 
mapped out the various grocery stores and markets that existed in Chinatown and implicitly 
troubled Restivo’s claims (see Figure 1).36 From the discrepancy between Restivo’s claims that 
Chinatown represented a food desert and the reality of existing grocery vendors in the area, one 
question in particular emerges: for what purpose did Restivo—as a spokesperson of Walmart—
construct this narrative of Chinatown? In framing the corporation’s aggressive pursuit of urban 
markets as one that also fulfilled a societal problem or need (namely, the lack of affordable 
groceries), Restivo attempted to justify Walmart’s entry into the neighborhood. 
 
                                                
34 “Walmart Launches Major Initiative to Make Food Healthier and Healthier Food More Affordable,” 
Walmart press release, Washington, DC, January 20, 2011, http://corporate.walmart.com/_news_/news-
archive/2011/01/20/walmart-launches-major-initiative-to-make-food-healthier-healthier-food-more-
affordable. See also Hank Cardello, “The Reasons for Walmart’s Healthy Foods Initiative,” The Atlantic, 
February 10, 2011, http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2011/02/the-reasons-for-walmarts-healthy-
foods-initiative/70904/.  
 
35 Yosuke Kitazawa, “Will Downtown L.A. Get Its ‘Holy Grail’ of Grocery Stores?” KCET Departures, 
May 29, 2012, https://www.kcet.org/departures-columns/will-downtown-la-get-its-holy-grail-of-grocery-
stores.  
 
36 “Grocery Shopping in Chinatown” flyer, Chinatown Community for Equitable Development, accessed 
June 30, 2016, http://www.laane.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/Walmart-and-Grocery-Shopping-
Flyers-Final.pdf.  
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Figure 1.1. ““Chinatown is not a Food Desert. Support Local Markets!” This flyer, created by 
Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED) members in September 2013, 
encouraged shoppers to support local markets. This inventory of grocery vendors in Chinatown 
also troubled the narrative that Chinatown was a food desert and that Walmart was much needed 
in the community to provide access to healthy, affordable groceries. 
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Media Timeline of Walmart in Chinatown 
 Walmart’s proposed entry into Los Angeles Chinatown made local and national headlines 
as the first location to open in Los Angeles proper.37 Both mainstream news outlets and 
independent publications (primarily online sources, including planning-oriented blogs that 
tracked development in Los Angeles) reported on the Chinatown Walmart as groups 
simultaneously opposed it and as lawsuits by community groups proceeded through the courts.38 
The mainstream news outlets avoided editorializing wherever possible and took a “just the facts” 
approach that featured the requisite diversity of opinions on the issue over time. On the other 
hand, the smaller, independent news outlets in Los Angeles tracked the development progress 
and also offered opinion pieces, first-person reflections, and commentary on both sides of the 
Chinatown Walmart issue. Over time, the independent news outlets became a place where the 
various narratives of the Chinatown Walmart were debated and contested. 
 An overview of the key moments in the media coverage of the Chinatown Walmart helps 
us to situate (and perhaps also periodize) the various media accounts that emerged at different 
                                                
37 While the Chinatown Walmart marked the retailer’s first location in the city of Los Angeles, Walmart 
had already successfully managed to open its first supercenter location in Palmdale (in the north part of 
Los Angeles County) in 2005. See Natasha Lee and David Pierson, “L.A. County Gets Its First Wal-Mart 
Supercenter,” Los Angeles Times, August 31, 2005, accessed July 3, 2016, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2005/aug/31/local/me-supercenter31. As the article notes, the choice behind the 
Palmdale location was an intentional part of Walmart’s strategy: “Wal-Mart's decision to place the first 
L.A. County store in Palmdale underscores the retail giant's strategy of opening its first supercenters in 
fast-growing, outlying areas where city leaders support new development and where unions are not as 
strong.” By September 2012, the Chinatown Walmart made its way to the headlines of the New York 
Times. Ian Lovett, “A Walmart for Chinatown Stirs a Fight in Los Angeles,” New York Times, September 
7, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/09/08/us/a-walmart-for-chinatown-stirs-a-fight-in-los-
angeles.html.  
 
38 The main opposition to Walmart included the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE), the 
Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA), the Southeast Asian Community Alliance (SEACA), 
and Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED), the community organization that 
emerged in Chinatown during this campaign. Organized labor was opposed, too, and the United Food and 
Commercial Workers (UFCW) Union Local 770 was a part of the anti-Walmart coalitional formation. At 
the time, UFCW was backing OUR Walmart, an organization created to organize Walmart workers. 
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moments in 2012 and 2013. As noted above, the first news of plans for Walmart to open in 
Chinatown—on the ground level of Grand Plaza, a senior housing complex—broke on February 
24, 2012, on the eve of the corporate retailer’s fiftieth birthday.39 By late March, four weeks after 
Walmart announced its plans, Los Angeles City Councilmember Ed Reyes had proposed a 
temporary ordinance that would block building permits for “formula retail” stores with 
“standardized facades, color schemes, decor, employee uniforms and merchandise.”40 Without 
naming Walmart, the proposed interim control ordinance appeared to target Walmart’s decision 
to enter Chinatown.41 Reyes stated that his intent behind the proposed law was to “protect the 
character of Chinatown” and to safeguard small businesses.42 Walmart criticized the proposed 
law, saying that it had “nothing to do with the needs of the district and everything to do with 
serving outside interests.”43 Despite Reyes’ efforts to fast-track the vote for the proposed interim 
control ordinance to Friday, March 23, 2012, it was a moot point; Walmart secured the final 
                                                
39 Bobbi Murray, “Grand Illusion: Walmart’s Birthday ‘Gift’ to Chinatown,” Capital and Main, March 5, 
2012, accessed July 4, 2016, http://capitalandmain.com/latest-news/issues/labor-and-economy/grand-
illusion-walmarts-birthday-gift-to-chinatown/. Murray’s piece provides a good analysis of the economic 
downturn, Walmart’s declining profits in the third quarter of 2011, and Walmart’s strategy to gain access 
to the new urban markets that would have included a downtown neighborhood like Los Angeles 
Chinatown. See also Stephanie Clifford, “Retailers See a Split in Behavior of Shoppers,” New York 
Times, November 15, 2011, accessed July 4, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/16/business/wal-
marts-profit-slips.html.  
 
40 David Zahniser and Shan Li, “L.A. Council Proposal Could Keep Wal-Mart Grocery Out of 
Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, March 22, 2012, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/mar/22/local/la-me-walmart-chinatown-20120322. At the time, 
Councilmember Ed Reyes represented Los Angeles City Council District 1 (which includes the 
neighborhood of Chinatown).  
 
41 Adrian Glick Kudler, “Proposed Ordinance Could Block the Chinatown Walmart,” Curbed LA, March 
21, 2012, http://la.curbed.com/2012/3/21/10386564/proposed-ordinance-could-block-the-chinatown-
walmart.  
 
42 Zahniser and Li, “L.A. Council Proposal Could Keep Wal-Mart Grocery Out of Chinatown,” Los 
Angeles Times, March 22, 2012. 
 
43 Ibid. 
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building and construction permits that it needed that Thursday, March 22, 2012.44 Following 
Walmart’s securing of the final permits it needed to begin work on the Chinatown store, the city 
council voted 13 to 0 to move forward with the proposed interim control ordinance and to 
instruct City Attorney Carmen Trutanich to draft the ordinance.45 One week later, on March 29, 
2012, the Los Angeles chapter of the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance (APALA-LA), 
working with the Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE) and other groups, filed an 
administrative appeal to challenge the building permits and to stop Walmart from obtaining its 
final certificate of occupancy, citing a 2004 city ordinance that “prevented Walmart from 
expanding a big box retail outlet in Los Angeles.”46 At the same time, APALA-LA and the labor 
groups who signed onto the appeal sought legal injunctive relief to keep the Walmart from 
opening; this relief was denied by a judge in September 2012, and again in November 2012.47 In 
                                                
44 “L.A. Gives Wal-Mart Permits for Chinatown Store Despite Concerns,” Los Angeles Times, March 23, 
2012, accessed July 4, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/03/la-gives-wal-mart-permit-to-
open-in-chinatown-despite-council-concerns.html; Neal Broverman, “Chinatown Walmart Nabs Permits 
Before Vote to Ban Chains,” Curbed LA, March 23, 2012, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://la.curbed.com/2012/3/23/10385802/chinatown-walmart-nabs-permits-day-before-vote-to-ban-
chains.  
 
45 Ibid. 
 
46 “Wal-Mart’s Chinatown Permits Challenged by L.A. Labor Nonprofit,” Los Angeles Times, March 29, 
2012, accessed July 3, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/03/wal-marts-chinatown-
permits-challenged-by-la-labor-nonprofit.html; “Opposition Appeals for No Walmart in Chinatown,” 
KPCC’s AirTalk, April 2, 2012, accessed July 3, 2016, 
http://www.scpr.org/programs/airtalk/2012/04/02/25845/chinatown-walmart/; Bobbi Murray, “Chinatown 
Fight’s Still On: Groups Appeal Walmart Permits,” LA Progressive, March 30, 2012, accessed July 4, 
2016, https://www.laprogressive.com/chinatown-walmart/.  
 
47 “Judge Refuses to Block Wal-Mart Project in Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, September 7, 2012, 
accessed July 4, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/09/wal-mart-chinatown.html; “Judge 
Again Refuses to Block Wal-Mart Construction in L.A. Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, November 20, 
2012, accessed July 4, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/judge-again-refuses-block-
los-angeles-wal-mart-chinatown-construction.html; Alice Walton, “Judge: Construction on Chinatown 
Walmart can continue for now,” KPCC, November 20, 2012, accessed July 4, 2016, 
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/news/2012/11/20/11182/judge-construction-chinatown-walmart-can-continue-
/.  
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December 2012, city planning officials upheld the building permits as legitimately issued by the 
City’s Department of Building and Safety.48 
June saw the next spate of news headlines around the Chinatown Walmart. That month, 
the Los Angeles Times reported that an employee of Mercury Public Affairs, a public relations 
firm hired by Walmart, had attempted to spy on Walmart’s opponents. Mercury Public Affairs, 
more specifically, was the lobbying firm that Walmart had contracted for $60,000 to lobby L.A. 
City Hall between January and March of 2012 to help bring the store to Chinatown.49 Stephanie 
Harnett, a senior associate at Mercury Public Affairs, had attended a closed news conference 
held by Warehouse Workers United—a labor organization that represented Walmart’s warehouse 
workers in Los Angeles—under a fake name.50 Using the moniker “Zoe Mitchell,” Harnett posed 
as a fictitious journalism student at the University of Southern California.51 She attended another 
event using the borrowed identity. Harnett was later exposed as having fraudulently identified 
herself as a journalism student at the University of Southern California at a news conference held 
by Walmart opponents.52 Walmart spokesperson Steven Restivo commented on the incident: 
“Our culture of integrity is a constant at Wal-Mart, and by not properly identifying herself, this 
                                                
48 David Zahniser, “L.A. Zoning Official Upholds Permits for Wal-Mart in Chinatown,” Los Angeles 
Times, December 28, 2012, http://articles.latimes.com/2012/dec/28/local/la-me-wal-mart-chinatown-
20121228.  
 
49 “Wal-Mart Consultant Posed as Reporter at Opposition’s L.A. Events,” Los Angeles Times, June 14, 
2012, accessed July 4, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/06/walmart-chinatown-
mercury-lobbyist.html. 
 
50 Patience Haggin, “Wal-Mart PR Rep Poses as Reporter to Infiltrate Union Meeting,” Time, June 15, 
2012, http://business.time.com/2012/06/15/wal-mart-pr-rep-poses-as-reporter-to-infiltrate-union-
meeting/.   
 
51 “Wal-Mart Consultant Posed as Reporter at Opposition’s L.A. Events,” Los Angeles Times, June 14, 
2012, accessed July 4, 2016, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/06/walmart-chinatown-
mercury-lobbyist.html. 
 
52 Ibid. 
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individual’s behavior was contrary to our values and the way we do business.” Restivo added, 
“We insist that all our vendors conduct themselves in a way that is transparent and honest and we 
will reinforce that expectation to ensure this type of activity is not repeated.”53 
The scandal involving Harnett was not the first involving Walmart and its questionable 
public relations ethics. In another 2006 incident, bloggers who were receiving compensation 
from Walmart had posed as ordinary consumers and had created a fake blog promoting the 
corporate retailer.54 The blog followed a fictitious couple, Jim and Laura, as they traveled across 
the United States and interviewed Walmart workers who conveniently and consistently 
expressed their satisfaction with the corporate retailer and their working conditions.55 Edelman, 
Walmart’s public relations firm at the time, had helped organize the astroturfing project.56 
Furthermore, the Harnett incident in 2012 occurred while Walmart was caught in a 
scandal involving the corporate retailer’s role in paying off Mexican officials—in more than $24 
million in bribes—to secure building and construction permits in various locations throughout 
Mexico, as the New York Times first reported in April 2012.57 Federal officials from the 
Department of Justice launched a criminal investigation over the bribery allegations.58 As the 
                                                
53 Steven Restivo, quoted in ibid. 
 
54 Pallavi Gogoi, “Wal-Mart vs. the blogosphere,” Bloomberg Businessweek, October 18, 2006, accessed 
August 20, 2016, http://www.nbcnews.com/id/15319926/ns/business-us_business/t/wal-mart-vs-
blogosphere/#.V9HHlD4rL-l.  
 
55 Ibid. 
 
56 Ibid. 
 
57 David Barstow, “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle,” New 
York Times, April 21, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/22/business/at-wal-mart-in-mexico-a-
bribe-inquiry-silenced.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.  
 
58 Sari Horwitz and Jia Lynn Yang, “Wal-Mart faces federal criminal probe tied to allegations of bribery 
in Mexico,” Washington Post, April 23, 2012, https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/wal-
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New York Times reported, the city officials who issued building permits figured among the 
primary targets of the corporate bribes:  
In the interviews [conducted by the Times], Mr. Cicero recounted how he had helped 
organize years of payoffs. He described personally dispatching two trusted outside 
lawyers to deliver envelopes of cash to government officials. They targeted mayors and 
city council members, obscure urban planners, low-level bureaucrats who issued permits 
— anyone with the power to thwart Wal-Mart’s growth. The bribes, he said, bought 
zoning approvals, reductions in environmental impact fees and the allegiance of 
neighborhood leaders.59 
Reading the newspaper accounts across geography would bring to mind potential connections 
and similarities between the bribery in Mexico to secure building permits and Walmart’s last-
minute securing of building permits for the Los Angeles Chinatown location. In fact, staff at the 
progressive online publication Capital and Main noted as much, writing that 
Walmart is targeting Los Angeles for aggressive expansion, seeking to open some 200 
stores in L.A. County. They hope one of the first will be in Chinatown, where, you may 
recall, last month, Walmart received building permits about 12 hours before a hearing in 
which the Los Angeles City Council voted unanimously to move forward on an interim 
control ordinance that would block the issuance of those permits. The L.A. Times said 
the company “outwitted” the council. The Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance has 
appealed these permits, alleging that they were improperly issued.60 
                                                                                                                                                       
mart-faces-federal-criminal-probe-tied-to-allegations-of-bribery-in-
mexico/2012/04/23/gIQA7t9lcT_story.html.  
 
59 Barstow, “Vast Mexico Bribery Case Hushed Up by Wal-Mart After Top-Level Struggle.” 
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On June 30, 2012, opponents of Walmart held a large rally and marched against the 
proposed Chinatown Walmart. The event began at the Los Angeles State Historic Park and 
ended at the dragon gates that mark the entrance to Chinatown at Broadway and Cesar Chavez 
Avenue. Because the action was designed to focus on Chinatown, this route allowed all the 
participants to march through the busiest commercial corridors of Chinatown where most small 
business owners could have witnessed the support. Thousands of people turned out. They 
included members of the Chinatown community, Walmart workers involved with the 
Organization United for Respect at Walmart (OUR Walmart), local unions, and Rage Against the 
Machine guitarist Tom Morello and musician Ben Harper.61  
After June, the media coverage of the Chinatown Walmart primarily focused on the legal 
and administrative appeals filed by a coalition of community and labor groups opposed to 
Walmart, as well as some other updates as Walmart proceeded with their plans to open up in 
Chinatown. On July 3, 2012, APALA and United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) 
Union Local 770 jointly filed a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, alleging that the Los 
Angeles City Department of Building and Safety “failed to notify the public of its decision to 
issue a Notice of Exemption (NOE), which allows Walmart to move forward on its Chinatown 
project without environmental review.”62 The legal challenge—Asian Pacific American Labor 
                                                                                                                                                       
60 “WebHot: Walmart Bribery Scandal Explodes,” Capital and Main, April 24, 2012, 
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62 Aiha Nguyen, “Lawsuit Challenges City’s Action on Walmart Chinatown Store,” Capital and Main, 
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The case was Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., case number 
BS138164, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. 
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Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al.—also requested a restraining order on construction at 
the Chinatown location. On September 7, 2012, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge 
James Chalfant refused to grant a restraining order on construction.63 On November 20, 2012, 
Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge James Chalfant again refused to grant an injunction to 
stop construction on the Chinatown Walmart store; Chalfant found no evidence of irreparable 
environmental harm from the ongoing Walmart construction.64 The legal challenge only 
appeared in media outlets when it was first filed and again when the judge issued decisions. 
In October 2012, Walmart announced its opening of a hiring center for the Chinatown 
store.65 Opponents of Walmart at LAANE commented on the premature opening of a hiring 
center before Walmart had obtained the final certificate of occupancy.66  
 Notably, in February 2013, UCLA undergraduate student and CCED member Jenny 
Chhea wrote an opinion piece for the Daily Bruin. In it, Chhea outlined all the ways in which 
Walmart was a threat to Los Angeles Chinatown in both moral and practical terms: 
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halt-construction-on-chinatown-walmart/; “Judge Denies Motion To Halt Construction On Chinatown 
Walmart,” CBS LA, September 7, 2012, http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/09/07/judge-denies-motion-
to-halt-construction-on-chinatown-walmart/.  
 
64 “Judge again refuses to block Wal-Mart construction in L.A. Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, 
November 20, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/11/judge-again-refuses-block-los-
angeles-wal-mart-chinatown-construction.html; Matthew Heller, “LA Judge Finds No Irreparable Harm 
From Chinatown Wal-Mart,” Law360, November 20, 2012, http://www.law360.com/articles/395758/la-
judge-finds-no-irreparable-harm-from-chinatown-wal-mart.  
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Wal-Mart should not be allowed to be built in Chinatown because of its labor practices, 
its destruction of small businesses, traffic and safety reasons and its gentrification effects 
– which would ultimately raise property values in Chinatown, displace low income 
families, and compromise the cultural integrity of Chinatown.67 
Chhea criticized the poor treatment of Walmart workers by drawing historical connections 
between the proposed Walmart in Chinatown in 2012 and the state-sanctioned removal and 
dispossession of Old Chinatown in the 1930s to make way for the construction of Union 
Station.68 Though the removal of Old Chinatown in the 1930s was a form of displacement 
facilitated by the state, the proposed Walmart in Chinatown in 2012 raised an ostensibly different 
specter of displacement, one that eschewed overt mass removal and took on a more indirect 
form. For Walmart, Chhea argued, that mode of indirect displacement marked a chain of events 
that began with the crowding out of small businesses from Los Angeles Chinatown and 
eventually manifested in higher commercial and residential rents—an increased burden on 
existing small business owners—as a result of increasing property values, driven by Walmart’s 
corporate entry into Chinatown. 
Remarkably, Chhea’s piece was the only op-ed in those two years that caught the 
attention of Walmart spokesperson Steven Restivo, whose direct response to Chhea’s piece was 
                                                
67 Jenny Chhea, “Addition of Wal-Mart to Chinatown Would Compromise the Area’s Cultural Integrity,” 
Daily Bruin, February 7, 2013, http://dailybruin.com/2013/02/07/addition-of-wal-mart-to-chinatown-
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68 For more on the removal of Old Chinatown in the 1930s, see Linda Ngov, “The Power of Publicity: 
The Fate of Los Angeles’ Old Chinatown, 1900-1939,” Gum Saan Journal 31:1 (2009): 1-18. See also 
Jan Lin and Eugene Moy, “The Removal and Renewal of Los Angeles Chinatown From the Exclusion 
Era to the Global Era,” American Sociological Association Annual Meeting, 2006. 
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published four days later in the Daily Bruin.69 In it, Restivo addressed Chhea’s critiques and 
defended the retailer’s employment practices and the prospect of new jobs coming to 
Chinatown.70 Restivo’s response here was notable insofar as it would remain the only direct 
response and line-by-line argumentation to any of the opposing arguments against Chinatown 
Walmart over the course of the entire anti-Walmart campaign, from February 2012 until the 
store’s opening in September 2013. Restivo had communicated Walmart’s talking points with 
various media outlets: he had provided comments to media in support of the Walmart in 
Chinatown and the affordable groceries it would provide, and he had penned a piece in July 2012 
in support of the City Planning Commission’s vote to disapprove the proposed formula retail 
ICO.71 In this case, Restivo specifically singled out Chhea’s op-ed in the Daily Bruin to provide 
a direct response to the opposition. No non-UCLA media covered the exchange between Chhea 
and Restivo in the opinion section of the Daily Bruin or picked up the pieces for reprint. 
 In April 2013, construction was already under way at the Chinatown Walmart store. That 
month, the coalition of community and labor groups opposed to the Chinatown Walmart turned 
to the courts again to block Walmart. This time, APALA-LA, alongside the Chinatown-based 
nonprofit Southeast Asian Community Alliance (SEACA), filed a lawsuit on April 4, 2013, 
against the City of Los Angeles. According to this lawsuit, officially known as Southeast Asian 
Community Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., the nonprofit groups claimed that “the 
city’s Community Redevelopment Agency board failed to review the Chinatown [Walmart] 
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project before building permits were awarded for the planned supermarket…[and] that a 
redevelopment vote was required.”72 Because there had been no such vote, the groups sought to 
revoke the building permits by challenging the propriety of the building permit issuance 
process.73  
 The mainstream media and other news outlets continued to report on large actions and 
events in the months leading up to the opening of the Chinatown Walmart store. The Walmart 
Neighborhood Market in Chinatown opened its doors at a soft opening on Friday, September 13, 
2013.74  The soft opening was also met with an action: at 8:30am that Friday, dozens of 
protestors showed up carrying a large papier-mâché puppet of Walmart and three large cardboard 
reproductions of famous Beijing opera masks.75 
The media accounts of the soft opening of Walmart noted both the potential benefits that 
the Chinatown store was poised to bring to the neighborhood while emphasizing the visibility of 
the opposition. For example, the Los Angeles Times article reporting on the soft opening 
remarked that the Chinatown Walmart would be “the first in the chain to sell tortilla strips and 
salsa from local nonprofit group Homeboy Industries.”76 This statement draws attention to some 
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of the ways in which Walmart was able to win over supporters in the neighborhood and 
surrounding areas—with commitments to fund various nonprofits in the Asian American 
community and, in the case of Homeboy Industries, to carry their products. Additionally, the Los 
Angeles Times article carried a quick comment from Walmart spokesperson Steven Restivo: 
Steve Restivo, Wal-Mart's senior director of community affairs, said shoppers were 
sending ‘a message that they want more affordable grocery options in their 
neighborhood.’ ‘The community response is clear and we look forward to serving 
residents here for years and years to come,’ he said.77 
Restivo’s comments fallaciously suggest that shoppers were speaking with their feet and 
demonstrating with their patronage at the store that they “want[ed] more affordable grocery 
options in their neighborhood.” This statement functions to uphold the assumption that 
Chinatown was indeed a food desert in need of this Walmart to provide the access to affordable 
groceries that the neighborhood purportedly lacked. This portrayal of Chinatown as a food desert 
was one challenged by activists and opponents who pointed to many existing grocery stores and 
vendors in Chinatown. Additionally, Restivo’s comments that the “community response [was] 
clear” were challenged by the opposition that greeted the Walmart at its soft opening and later. 
Though the Los Angeles Times noticed the opposition to the Walmart on the morning of 
its soft opening, it overlooked the symbolism that went into planning the visuals for the action. 
The reporting from the Times characterized anti-Walmart activists and opponents as “toting 
papier-mache puppets designed to look like the ghosts of local small businesses.”78 In fact, these 
were not ghosts but rather well-known Beijing opera figures that symbolized cultural 
guardianship over Chinatown. The opera masks featured Zhongli Chun, a historic woman 
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warrior famed for cleverness; Guan Yu, a warrior general known for loyalty and righteousness; 
and Liu Bei, a warrior emperor associated with benevolence and humanity.79 The visuals also 
featured a cartoonish puppet of Walmart made to look villainous (see Figure 2). 
 
 
Figure 1.2. CCED members at the November 7, 2013, action wielding the cardboard Beijing 
opera masks—which represented famous heroes from Beijing opera—and a papier-mâché 
personification of Walmart. Masks/puppets from left to right: Guan Yu (red), Zhongli Chun 
(blue), Walmart puppet, Liu Bei (white). 
 
                                                
79 Chinatown Community for Equitable Development, Facebook page, November 8, 2013. The caption 
for the photo of CCED members with the Chinese opera masks and Walmart puppet briefly introduced 
each opera mask figure and the values associated with them. 
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These puppets would re-appear in a November 7, 2013, anti-Walmart action in Los 
Angeles Chinatown organized by Walmart worker members of the UFCW-supported 
Organization United for Respect at Walmart (OUR Walmart). During the November action, 
police officers arrested a group of 54 demonstrators outside the Chinatown Walmart location in a 
planned civil disobedience.80 According to the organizers, the November 2013 action was the 
largest single act of civil disobedience in the history of Walmart.81 
 
Analysis of Media Coverage 
Even in the mainstream media accounts of the opposition to the Chinatown Walmart, 
however, articles, stories, and news segments needed to aspire to impartiality by including 
arguments on both sides. For example, one local NBC news article cites Chinatown activist Sissy 
Trinh’s arguments surrounding Walmart’s reputation for unfair employment practices and 
pushing out local businesses: “We wouldn’t be against Walmart if they didn’t have such a bad 
track record.”82 In the balancing act to include the other side of the issue, the same segment 
provides a response to Trinh’s comments, citing Jenny Schuetz, an assistant professor in urban 
economics from the USC Price School of Public Policy. According to Schuetz, “Walmart’s 
economic success indicates that a superstore may be what consumers want.”83  
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Overall, the media outlets reported on the decisions and announcements from the legal 
and administrative appeals and closely documented the highly visible actions and demonstrations 
organized by Walmart opponents in Chinatown. Outside of these processes, however, the 
grassroots organizing and community mobilizations perhaps fell beyond the scope of the media 
outlets. It is in these extra-media processes that more perspectives might be revealed. 
 
Los Angeles Chinatown as a Food Desert 
Based on Restivo’s claims that Walmart in Chinatown would address the need for 
affordable, healthy groceries, Walmart’s messaging around Los Angeles Chinatown seemed to 
position the neighborhood as a food desert—a neighborhood that lacks access to healthy food 
sources.84 The claim that Chinatown was a food desert had emerged from Walmart 
representatives and business advocacy organizations in the months leading up to the City 
Council vote on the ICO in March 2012. As Walmart media representative Rachel Wall 
explained to Sukjong Hong of Open City Magazine, “We use the word, ‘underserved.’ There is 
no traditional full-service grocery store in downtown, according to the LA Chamber of 
Commerce.”85 In this narrative, Chinatown was cast as a place to be rescued by the world’s 
largest neoliberal corporate retailer. The “exception” of Chinatown as a food desert needing to be 
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rescued in the liberal narrative of Walmart was not an exception in reality.  Rather, Walmart has 
a track record—indeed, a normalized rule—of mobilizing food insecurity arguments to defend its 
decisions to move into rural and urban communities.86 The food desert narrative quickly became 
one challenged by community activists in the neighborhood and the labor-community coalition 
that formed to fight the Chinatown Walmart Neighborhood Market. 
By October 2012, amid a nation-wide strike (that started in Los Angeles) by Walmart 
workers dissatisfied with low wages and reduced hours, Walmart announced its plans to open 
more Neighborhood Market and Express stores.87 The independent media outlets became a 
public site of contestation for the varying opinions around the Chinatown Walmart. In March 
2012, Sue Laris—editor and publisher of the Los Angeles Downtown News—supported the 
City’s decision to grant Walmart a building permit.88  As Laris explained, 
Chinatown is a complete community with residential, retail, schools, library, hospital, 
Chamber of Commerce, even a long history of independence. It happens to reside inside 
the city of Los Angeles, but if Chiinatown [sic] wants a Wal-Mart there, it should have it. 
And Chinatown does want it, specifically where a grocery store has long been planned, 
on the ground floor of a housing development at 701 W. Cesar Chavez. 
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For a frame of reference, this is not my macro position on Wal-Mart, which I 
generally oppose. But this is specific to Chinatown or any other community with a 
distinct character. 
I grew up in Ferndale, California, a Victorian village on the National Register of 
Historic Places, which has banned all chain stores. No chain grocery store, no Starbucks, 
no chain pharmacy. No stoplight, for that matter, but that’s another story. 
Then there’s Healdsburg, in Sonoma County, California, which has also banned 
chain stores of any description to preserve its charming small-town character as a tourist 
draw. Towns that prohibit chain stores are all over America. 
In short, if Chinatown had wanted to keep its local character, I would have 
enthusiastically supported that stance. But they don’t. They want to grow like a real town, 
not just a tourist town. City Hall should respect that, City Council should respect that. 
[The Department of] Building and Safety did respect that and approved the final 
building permit about 15 hours before the City Council was to discuss the matter. 
Laris’ argument in favor of the Department of Building and Safety’s decision to approve the 
final building permit for the Chinatown Walmart appears to be predicated on the basis of the 
desires of a monolithic Chinatown community. That is, Laris believes that “[t]hey want to grow 
like a real town, not just a tourist town.”89 According to Laris, the neighborhood should be left to 
make its own decision about Walmart, and “if Chinatown had wanted to keep its local character, 
[Laris] would have enthusiastically supported that stance.”90 Laris concludes—perhaps based on 
the opinions and stances put forth by the Chinatown business elite who claimed to represent the 
Chinatown community—that Chinatown does indeed welcome the opportunity for growth. In 
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presuming a unified Chinatown (“they”) that supported “real town” economic growth, however, 
Laris’ editorial raises the question of who represents and constitutes the “Chinatown” that Laris 
writes about. The anti-Walmart activists and residents in Chinatown sought to provide 
counternarratives to the prevailing story that Walmart was good for business in Chinatown; in 
challenging the dominant narrative of the business elite who claimed to represent the entirety of 
Chinatown, these activists and residents troubled the authority of the ethnic elite in Los Angeles 
Chinatown and highlighted the heterogeneous, complex realities of the neighborhood. 
 
The ‘Clap Back’91 
The narratives and arguments constructed by the various mainstream and independent 
media outlets did not remain unanswered. Community activists and organizations that were 
strategizing against Walmart recognized the need to control the media narrative early in the 
campaign. Accordingly, they attempted to respond in mainstream news coverage and to mobilize 
independent news outlets and online publications to make their arguments more visible. Aiha 
Nguyen, then a researcher at the worker advocacy organization Los Angeles Alliance for a New 
Economy (LAANE), published an online article through Capital and Main—a progressive-
leaning online publication that “explores the economic and social faultlines of contemporary 
California”—the same day that news of the Chinatown Walmart became public.92 In it, Nguyen 
upheld the significance of “quality of life” considerations in Chinatown, criticized Walmart’s 
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labor practices, and underscored the role of Los Angeles city officials in responsible 
development: 
Nearly 25 years ago, when this project was first being considered, homeowners and 
residents were already concerned about the project’s potential impact on the quality of 
life of the neighborhood; the fact that a Walmart wants to occupy the retail space creates 
a more adverse impact. The site, developed in cooperation with the Community 
Redevelopment Agency (CRA), received over $3 million in subsidies as well as other 
benefits. 
Even though the CRA is no longer around, the city is still responsible for ensuring 
that public dollars are well spent. The city should ensure this project generates good jobs 
for local residents, that the operations of the business do not create hardship for local 
businesses and residents, and that the character of this historic neighborhood is not 
dramatically harmed. The city of L.A. can’t afford to simply believe Walmart’s 
unsubstantiated promises of jobs and food at the risk of the community’s existing 
residents and businesses. It is a dishonor to Chinatown, one of our most vital and cultural 
neighborhoods, to allow Walmart to come in without putting safeguards in place to 
ensure that the needs of the community are met first.93 
In Nguyen’s article, the beginnings of a counter-narrative to the one that Restivo sought to 
construct can be seen. This counter-narrative is not only specific to the needs and composition of 
Chinatown, it also draws city-wide implications regarding the closure of the Community 
Redevelopment Agency (CRA), which was dissolved by Governor Jerry Brown in 2011, and 
attempts to hold city officials accountable for its public spending in the years that the CRA was 
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around.94 Specifically, Nguyen speaks to the intended mission of the CRA to improve 
communities with an eye toward responsible community economic development. Additionally, 
Nguyen speaks to the many small businesses in Chinatown that stand to be hurt by the entry of a 
Walmart into the neighborhood.  
 
Life After Walmart: An Epilogue 
On January 15, 2016, Walmart announced that it would close 269 stores, including over 
150 stores throughout the United States. The nine stores in California that were slated for closure 
included the Chinatown Walmart, which was scheduled to close in two days’ time.95 Despite 
Walmart’s claim that it was committed to addressing food insecurity in Chinatown and other 
                                                
94 For more on the dissolution of municipal redevelopment agencies throughout California, see 
“Redevelopment Dissolution,” http://redevelopmentdissolution.lacounty.gov/wps/portal/rdd; “CRA’s 
Demise Puts Downtown Properties in Limbo,” Los Angeles Downtown News, January 16, 2012, 
http://www.ladowntownnews.com/news/cra-s-demise-puts-downtown-properties-in-
limbo/article_48bead16-3e37-11e1-8438-0019bb2963f4.html; David Zahniser and Jessica Garrison, 
“L.A. assesses costs of shuttering redevelopment agency,” Los Angeles Times, January 11, 2012, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2012/jan/11/local/la-me-redevelop-20120111; and Casey Blount, Wendy Ip, 
Ikuo Nakano, and Elaine Ng, “Redevelopment Agencies in California: History, Benefits, Excesses, and 
Closure,” Economic Market Analysis working paper series, Working Paper No. EMAD-2014-01, U.S. 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, Office of Policy Development and Research, January 
2014, accessed July 3, 2016, 
https://www.huduser.gov/portal/publications/redevelopment_whitepaper.pdf. The California Supreme 
Court upheld the dissolution in California Redevelopment Association v. Matosantos, 53 Cal. 4th 231, 
267 P.3d 580, 135 Cal. Rptr. 3d 683 (2011). Following the elimination of these redevelopment agencies, 
the need for public spending to facilitate economic development and affordable housing construction 
remained, as seen by Governor Jerry Brown’s decision in 2015 to sign into law Assembly Bill 2, which 
created redevelopment agency-like entities called Community Revitalization Investment Authorities. See 
“California Redevelopment Agencies, The Sequel,” Los Angeles Times, September 22, 2013, 
http://articles.latimes.com/2013/sep/22/opinion/la-ed-redevelopment-20130922; and Melanie Mason and 
Patrick McGreevy, “Gov. Brown approves new plan to target blight in California,” Los Angeles Times, 
September 22, 2015, http://www.latimes.com/local/political/la-me-pc-brown-signs-anti-blight-measures-
20150922-story.html. See also Brandon Powell, “The Fall of California’s Redevelopment Agencies and 
the Rise of Sustainable Communities Investment Authorities: How SB 1 Can Maximize  Fairness and 
Economic Growth,” Western State University Law Review 42, no. 1 (September 2014): 61-83. 
 
95 Samantha Masunaga, “Wal-Mart to close 269 stores, including 154 in the U.S. and 9 in California,” Los 
Angeles Times, January 15, 2016, http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-walmart-closing-stores-
20160115-story.html.   
 39 
places where it had opened stores, the store closures raised again the specter of food insecurity in 
rural regions and highlighted the lack of community accountability on the part of Walmart.96 
All of the arguments captured in the media emerged over time in the media outlets. Over 
the period of the campaign, the anti-Walmart coalition refined its communications strategy to 
challenge certain dominant narratives that emerged around Chinatown and the controversy and to 
produce narratives that focused on Chinatown small business owners and residents. 
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Chapter Two 
Examining the City and Legal Archives in the “No Walmart in Chinatown” Campaign 
 
Borderlands historian Emma Perez encourages us to challenge the exclusion of racialized 
sexualities and the dominant historical narratives that have ‘chosen to ignore or negate 
the populations who are on the margins, outside of normative behavior.’ Perez’s self-
conscious approach meshes queering with borderlands analysis by encouraging the 
mining and reinterpreting of the borderlands legal archive for lost and silenced 
heterogeneities. By casting a queer and critical borderlands perspective on the state’s 
records, Perez advocates reassembling alternative histories embedded in the legal archive 
of normalization.97 
—Nayan Shah 
 
How do we think about state-constructed archives as principal authoritative evidence? In 
this chapter, I argue that, much like the mainstream media narratives, the ways in which the city 
and courts constructed and archived the anti-Walmart campaign demonstrate further attempts at 
“privatizing,” or individualizing, the Chinatown Walmart conflict and “dumping spatial scale.”98 
That is, the city and courts produced justifications and explanations for the Chinatown Walmart 
that focused on smaller (sometimes more contained) spatial scales while simultaneously working 
to “ensure the accumulation of capital at ever larger scales,” in the words of geographer Clement 
Lai.99 In this case, the accumulation of capital refers to the processes of accumulation being 
driven by Walmart in its labor practices and in its cost-cutting decisions in the supply chain. 
Additionally, I argue that various labor and community groups involved in the campaign against 
the Walmart Neighborhood Market in Chinatown—inclusive of Chinatown Community for 
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Making of Ordinary Americans,” American Quarterly 57, no. 3 (2005): 721; the quotation that Shah is 
incorporating in this epigraph comes from Roderick Ferguson, Aberrations in Black: Toward a Queer of 
Color Critique (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2003). 
 
98 Joseph Nevins, “Contesting the Boundaries of International Justice: State Counter-Mapping and 
Offshore Resource Struggles Between East Timor and Australia,” Economic Geography 40, no. 1 (2004): 
13; Lai, “Between ‘Blight’ and a New World,” 3. 
 
99 Lai, “Between ‘Blight’ and a New World,” 3. 
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Equitable Development (CCED)—grounded their strategy partially in legal and planning terms, 
as well as the bureaucratic decision-making of the state apparatus. In doing so, they launched a 
legal fight with the state that revealed on some levels the limitations of trafficking in the legal 
and technical language of the state. Moreover, the legal fight against Walmart shed light on the 
complex ways in which the state is changing and remaking itself—potentially in the service of 
private, corporate-driven development in the Los Angeles Chinatown area specifically and the 
downtown Los Angeles area more broadly.100 In focusing on the ways in which the legal and 
state apparatuses are made visible in the campaign against Walmart, this chapter tracks the state 
in the documents of the Office of the City Clerk in the Los Angeles City Archives. At the same 
time, I also read for absences in these texts, noting specifically those actions and stories that are 
not held up as authoritative evidence or testimony. This chapter therefore demonstrates the 
limitations of relying solely on these official planning documents as texts with which to 
understand the campaign against Walmart in Chinatown. 
Drawing inspiration from Jodi Kim’s and Nayan Shah’s re-imagination of what sources 
might constitute a legitimate archive and what texts might be read as official, I focus on three 
sets of state documents: (1) the official log of City Council materials concerning the fight to pass 
an interim control ordinance (ICO) that would prevent large retailers from opening up shop in 
Los Angeles; (2) the appeal to the Los Angeles City Department of Building and Safety 
challenging the city’s issuance of building permits to Walmart, an appeal by opposition groups 
led by Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance – Los Angeles (APALA-LA); and (3) selected 
                                                
100 For more on state rebuilding and the complexity of various state institutions in activist struggles, see 
Ruth Wilson Gilmore and Craig Gilmore, “Restating the Obvious,” in Indefensible Space: The 
Architecture of the National Insecurity State, ed. Michael Sorkin (New York: Routledge, 2008), 141-162. 
Gilmore and Gilmore are writing of the state’s “anti-state state-building” project of prison expansion, 
though I am extending their analysis to consider the ways in which the state’s ongoing restructuring 
process might lend itself to permitting the private developer- and corporate-driven reconfiguration of the 
city in the current wave of gentrification. 
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legal documents from the lawsuit that the Southeast Asian Community Alliance (SEACA) and 
APALA-LA filed against the City of Los Angeles in April 2013.101 
This chapter analyzes these three sets of documents because they make up the primary 
content of the conversations and debates around Chinatown Walmart that were happening in 
relation to the city and the courts. By examining at the log of official documents from the Office 
of the City Clerk in the Los Angeles City Archives, I was able to focus on a specific part of the 
early campaign that focused on the passage of an interim control ordinance to ban big-box 
retailers in Chinatown. Similarly, the appeal to city planning officials, which challenged the 
building permits acquired by Walmart, and the officials’ response both relate to the specific 
action of the Department of Building and Safety in issuing building permits to Walmart in March 
2012. And finally, the legal documents include the initial lawsuit as well as two briefs (both pro-
Walmart in Chinatown) filed by Walmart and the successor to the Community Redevelopment 
Agency, the Designated Legal Authority. While these temporal parameters made the city 
archives more manageable, they also help to foreground particular mainstream perspectives of 
Los Angeles Chinatown as a contested space along dimensions of race, gender, and class. These 
perspectives emerged in the official city and legal documents.  
 
The Interim Control Ordinance 
The debates around the interim control ordinance were constructed in terms of pro-labor 
and pro-business narratives from the moment the ordinance arose as a point of discussion in the 
                                                
101 Jodi Kim and Nayan Shah separately think about public records and state archives in particularly 
interesting ways through their works. Through these readings of state archives as texts that can be mined 
for rich analysis, they open up possibilities for understanding state and public records in potentially new 
ways. For more, see Jodi Kim, Ends of Empire: Asian American Critique and the Cold War (Minneapolis: 
University of Minnesota Press, 2010), and Nayan Shah, Contagious Divides: Epidemics and Race in San 
Francisco’s Chinatown (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
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chambers of the City Council. On Friday, March 23, 2012, the Los Angeles City Council 
adopted a motion—presented by then Councilmember Ed Reyes and seconded by then 
Councilmember Eric Garcetti—for an interim control ordinance (ICO) that would temporarily 
prohibit permits for new formula retail uses (i.e., chain stores) that occupied spaces 20,000 
square feet or larger in Los Angeles Chinatown.102 In his introduction of the motion to the 
council, Councilmember Reyes raised concerns over the history and character of Chinatown, the 
impact on traffic that a Walmart might have on the area, and the review needed in the wake of a 
reduced city planning budget and a dissolved Community Redevelopment Agency (CRA).103 
This proposal marked a momentary triumph for opponents of the Chinatown Walmart. In 
his written motion to the City Council for the interim control ordinance, Councilmember Ed 
Reyes appealed for Chinatown as an exception—that is, to portray Chinatown as a unique place 
worthy of preservation: 
Chinatown is a focal point of commerce and culture for the Chinese population of 
Southern California with a unique and historical character. 
There is a need to protect Chinatown’s historically significant resources, 
including its vibrant small business sector, which supports the needs of local residents 
and are compatible with the neighborhood; create a supportive environment for new 
small business innovations; and preserve and enhance existing neighborhood-serving 
retail uses and future opportunities for resident employment, and business ownership. 
                                                
102 Formula retail uses are typically defined by standardized exterior features (e.g., logos). For more on 
the specific characteristics of formula retail uses, see “Chain Stores (Formula Retail Use),” City and 
County of San Francisco Planning Department, http://sf-planning.org/chain-stores-formula-retail-use.  
 
103 Ed Reyes, Los Angeles City Council meeting, March 23, 2012, 
http://lacity.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=129&clip_id=10248. 
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As such, the City needs to pursue the necessary land use regulatory controls to 
protect Chinatown from the establishment of new Formula Retail Uses, characterized as 
those businesses that maintain two or more of the following features: a standardized array 
of merchandise, a standardized façade, a standardized décor and color scheme, a uniform 
apparel, standardized signage, a trademark or a servicemark.104 
The interim control ordinance mentioned big-box retailers generally, though its arrival on the 
heels of Walmart’s announcement to open up a store in Chinatown suggests that Reyes’ motion 
may have implicitly had in mind the Walmart Neighborhood Market that was poised to enter Los 
Angeles Chinatown in 2012. Indeed, the Los Angeles Times and various media outlets noted that 
this ordinance had been drafted specifically as a response to Walmart’s efforts to open up the 
Chinatown Neighborhood Market.105 In his comments to the press, Reyes reiterated his point 
about Chinatown as a “unique” case that distinctly merited the passage of the ordinance: 
Chinatown is deserving of such protections [in this case, a ban on big-box retailers]. 
Chinatown is a community of unique historical significance to the city of Los Angeles. It 
is our intent to continue to work with the community to preserve its historic nature, and 
the balance and diversity of services there, while working closely with the local 
businesses.106 
                                                
104 “Motion,” Council File No. 12-0382, March 16, 2012, Los Angeles City Archives, Office of the City 
Clerk, Los Angeles, CA, 
https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=ccfi.viewrecord&cfnumber=12-0382. 
 
105 “Big-box ban targeting Chinatown Wal-Mart fails to get enough votes,” Los Angeles Times, October 
23, 2012, http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/lanow/2012/10/big-box-ban-targeting-chinatown-wal-mart-
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106 Then-councilmember Ed Reyes, quoted in Alice Walton, “Chinatown’s Big-Box Ban Headed to LA 
City Council Committee,” Southern California Public Radio / 89.3 KPCC, July 13, 2012, 
http://www.scpr.org/blogs/news/2012/07/13/7054/chinatowns-big-box-ban-headed-planning-committee/.  
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In order to emphasize the significance of the motion to ban big-box retailers in Los Angeles, 
Reyes felt compelled to traffic in the language of exception when speaking about Los Angeles 
Chinatown as a community of “unique historical significance” to the city—one that is 
particularly “deserving of such protections.”107 
Some of the other members of the City Council expressed concern with the precedent that 
the ICO might be setting beyond Council District 1. While acknowledging that Walmart would 
be allowed to proceed, Krekorian expressed support for existing businesses and the “broader 
issue of the protection of Chinatown,” Krekorian also shared his concern that the ICO might set a 
precedent of “changing the rules on businesses at the last minute.”108  
As far back as the laundry ordinance at the heart of the 1886 court case, Yick Wo v. 
Hopkins, there have been policies and ordinances that include oblique references to the entities 
and people at which these laws are aimed at regulating, managing, and excluding.109 In the case 
of the Chinatown Walmart, the roles appear to have been reversed, with the proposed ICO’s 
temporary prohibitions aimed at formula retail all but directly naming Walmart. Even in the 
discussions within City Council chambers around the ICO in March 2012, various 
councilmembers alluded to the Chinatown Walmart store without naming it. Councilmember 
                                                
107 Ibid. 
 
108 Paul Krekorian, Los Angeles City Council meeting, March 23, 2012, 
http://lacity.granicus.com/MediaPlayer.php?view_id=129&clip_id=10248. At the March 23, 2012, City 
Council meeting, General Manager Robert “Bud” Ovrom of the Department of Building Safety 
announced that, a day earlier, the department had already issued building permits to Walmart to move 
forward with construction at the Chinatown location.108 
 
109 Victor Bascara, “‘In the Future to Any Third Power’: ‘Most Favored Nations,’ Personhood, and an 
Emergent World Order in Yick Wo v. Hopkins [1886],” Asian American Law Journal 21, no. 1 (2014): 
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Krekorian, for instance, noted that much of the public comment addressed “one particular retailer 
going into one particular location.”110 
While the councilmembers appeared reluctant to name the retailer that could not be 
named in the course of the discussion, the public did not hesitate.111 The testimony and public 
comment offered to the Los Angeles City Council often appeared to take a stance on either side 
of the Walmart controversy. The center of gravity of the debate had always been the Walmart, 
something that became clear in the testimony; the conversation as a whole became less about the 
passage of the ICO and more about the support and opposition of Walmart. The public comments 
at the March 23, 2012, City Council meeting conveyed a general sense of where the pro-Walmart 
and anti-Walmart stakeholders stood on the passage of the ICO.  
On the one hand, organized labor, labor advocacy groups, and their progressive allies 
came out in support for the ICO motion. These supporters included the Los Angeles Alliance for 
a New Economy (LAANE), a labor and economic justice advocacy organization; Clergy and 
Laity United for Economic Justice (CLUE), an interfaith advocacy organization; and various 
Chinatown small businesses and residents. James Elmendorf from LAANE spoke in favor of 
developing the language for the ICO, noting the presence of four full-service grocery stores and 
other small businesses in Chinatown that could potentially be hurt by the entry of a Walmart 
                                                
110 Paul Krekorian, Los Angeles City Council meeting, March 23, 2012, 
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111 The councilmembers may have been reluctant to name Walmart in the discussion on the ICO because 
the ICO did not target any one specific development, though the motion to draft an ICO was a clear 
response to news of the Chinatown Walmart. At one point during the March 23, 2012, City Council 
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the clarification, “This is about an interim control ordinance, not any one project.” Los Angeles City 
Council meeting, March 23, 2012. 
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Neighborhood Market. While highlighting Walmart’s reputation for poor working standards and 
for crowding out small businesses, Elmendorf added in his remarks that “the government’s 
responsibility here is to ensure that economic development occurs in a way that benefits the 
community.”112 One Walmart worker, Girshriela Green, offered public comment regarding 
Walmart’s mistreatment of workers and poor working standards. Green, a department manager at 
the Crenshaw Walmart location, shared her experience with a serious workplace injury and the 
lack of support she received from Walmart afterward.113 Chris Cheung, a co-owner of the family-
run Wonder Bakery in Central Plaza, voiced his concern about competition with the corporate 
retailer and potential increases in commercial rents in a post-Walmart Chinatown, concluding 
with his desire for “development that will support existing businesses, not chain stores.”114 Other 
Chinatown-based small business owners, and in some cases their family members, voiced similar 
concerns about Walmart’s potential to negatively affect small businesses in the area. Likewise, 
Chinatown community residents spoke out against Walmart and in support of the motion to draft 
the ICO. Christilily Chiv, a 23-year-old Chinatown resident, presented letters of support from 
other Chinatown youth who expressed their opposition to Walmart.115  
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On the other hand, the opponents of the ICO motion generally included Los Angeles and 
Chinatown area business advocacy organizations. The opponents to the ICO motion at the March 
2012 City Council meeting included the Central City Association of Los Angeles, the California 
Grocers Association, the Valley Industry and Commerce Association, and the Los Angeles Area 
Chamber of Commerce. Their representatives focused on the precedent that the ICO, if 
approved, would set for business owners throughout Los Angeles. In the words of Gary Toebben 
of the Los Angeles Area Chamber of Commerce: 
The action you are considering today is a lot bigger than Walmart, and it’s a lot bigger 
than Chinatown. This motion is about every business in Los Angeles, it’s about every 
property owner in Los Angeles, and it’s about every consumer in every neighborhood in 
Los Angeles. This motion will send a chilling—a chilling—message to all businesses, 
large and small, in Los Angeles. It doesn’t make any difference where you are in your 
process and whether you have followed all the rules, somebody can yank it out from 
under you, even if you followed every single rule. That is not what built the economy of 
our nation. We need to allow businesses who follow the rules to join our community and 
invest in jobs and tax base [sic].116 
In framing the ICO as an ordinance that would punish businesses “who follow the rules,” 
Toebben and other business representatives with similar concerns alluded to Walmart’s process 
of securing the Chinatown location per the existing city planning processes. 
The opposition also included representatives of what might be understood to be the 
primarily entrepreneurial “ethnic elite” of Los Angeles Chinatown—that is, a class of Chinese 
American business owners and community leaders who not only control resources but also hold 
                                                
116 Gary Toebben, Los Angeles City Council meeting, March 23, 2012. 
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considerable political influence.117 Larry Jung, speaking against the motion for the ICO on behalf 
of the Los Angeles Chinatown Corporation—which owns and operates the Central Plaza in Los 
Angeles Chinatown—invoked an “insider/outsider” dichotomy: 
I am displeased with all the outside interference. I believe that Councilman Reyes has our 
best interests. I believe that Chinatown should determine their own destiny [sic]. We, the 
people of Chinatown, that live there, that work there, that own property there, should 
decide who comes into Chinatown. I object to all these outside interferences [sic]. Where 
were they when Chinatown needed help? Councilman Reyes was there. The BID [the 
Chinatown Business Improvement District], Councilman Reyes, and the community 
should decide who comes into Chinatown. Otherwise, we will lose Chinatown like we 
did eighty years ago.118 
By situating the opposition to the Walmart in Chinatown collectively as “outside interference,” 
Jung positioned himself as an insider and a representative of the Chinatown “community” who 
ought to have the final say over “who comes into Chinatown.”119 Using similar rhetoric, Nicki 
Ung, executive director of the Chinese Chamber of Commerce of Los Angeles, expressed her 
support for Walmart and the potential draw it might create for major retailers in Chinatown, 
while reinforcing the “insider/outsider” dichotomy in her concluding remark: “Please hear the 
voice of the community directly affected by this, and not the outsiders. The loudest voice, as I’ve 
                                                
117 In using the term “ethnic elite” here in the distinct context of Los Angeles Chinatown, I borrow from 
the similar way that sociologist Angie Chung conceives of an “ethnic elite” in Los Angeles Koreatown. In 
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over the immigrant-dominated population.” Angie Chung, Legacies of Struggle: Conflict and 
Cooperation in Korean American Politics (Stanford University Press, 2007), 20. 
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told Councilmember Garcetti—the loudest voice is not the voice of the majority.”120 In addition, 
George Yu, speaking on behalf of Far East Plaza, defended the proposed arrival of Walmart and 
added his own remark about the “outside” opposition: “We never wanted to make Chinatown the 
battleground, and all of the outside interests, and the special interests that’s [sic] making it this 
way is [sic] creating real difficulties for all of us.”121 Notably, Kim Benjamin, who at the time 
was president of the Historic and Cultural Neighborhood Council (HCNC) and president of the 
Chinatown Business Improvement District (BID), shared both organizations’ backing of the ICO 
motion. Of note, too, were the pro-Walmart remarks from a group of seniors from the Grand 
Plaza Senior Apartments, which was part of the building that the Chinatown Walmart would 
occupy. The seniors, speaking on behalf of the senior association in their building, talked about 
the convenience of having a Walmart in the immediate vicinity.122 
In the written letters sent in from the public, the conversation around the ICO appeared to 
discuss the advantages and disadvantages of Walmart entering Los Angeles Chinatown as well. 
For example, Xiayi (Shirley) Zhang wrote in an email about the benefits of Walmart. Alluding to 
the interim control ordinance but never directly referencing it, she disclosed: 
As a resident of Victor Heights, I was ecstatic about Walmart opening up shop just down 
the street from me. 
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I work a part-time job and go to school. When I come home at 7 or 8 in the 
evening, there are NO options for me to do my grocery shopping in my neighborhood. I 
do try to support local small business and have done my shopping there when I can, but 
the merchants in the Chinatown/Victor Heights area simply do not fulfill my needs on my 
schedule. 
There is a concern that big box stores may negatively impact business for smaller 
grocers, however, any stroll through Chinatown’s streets and you will find that its [sic] 
most of its merchant’s [sic] offerings will never find their way into a mainstream 
American store. Until the day that Walmart starts selling live chickens, Ralph’s starts 
carrying durian, or Vons offers galanga, there will not be direct competition between 
large retailers and small business. Major grocers and our local merchants have always 
catered to different audiences. 
I believe that additional amenities to the community improve quality of life for its 
residents. Having the option of going to a large grocery store with mainstream products 
or going to an ethnic market with specialized products should be a choice that we as 
consumers have the option to make. I hope that by having Walmart or any large, 
mainstream retailer establish a presence in the community, Chinatown and its 
neighboring communities will become more desirable and more convenient 
neighborhoods to live in.123 
In this passage, Zhang first establishes her Chinatown residency for credibility, and then 
introduces her organized talking points. She constructs a dichotomy between Walmart and the 
local Chinatown merchants, explaining that the contrast in the products carried by smaller stores 
                                                
123 Xiayi Zhang, “Concerned Resident Regarding Proposed ICO in Chinatown,” email dated October 23, 
2012, Los Angeles City Archives, Office of the City Clerk. Los Angeles, CA, 
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(e.g., live chickens, durian, or galangal) and those provided by Walmart is large enough that they 
will not be in direct competition with each other. Zhang concludes the letter with the hope that 
Walmart—“or any large mainstream retailer”—would increase the desirability (and 
convenience) of Chinatown and its surrounding neighborhoods. 
Similarly, the support for the ICO was reduced to Walmart’s economic blast radius. In a 
letter written by the owners of a small business in Chinatown, Jenny Mai Fast Food described the 
circumstances of the small business they operated: 
I am a business owner, and I have run a restaurant / fast food since 2011 in Chinatown. 
My parents have had business here since 2004 in Chinatown. This store supports my 
parents and my siblings. This store enables my family to pay for rent, college, and to 
sustain a living. If Walmart drives away my store’s business and my store has to close 
down eventually, I will have to retire our business and my family will be without 
stability. It will be hard for my family to sustain a living. Please consider Chinatown and 
its people.124 
Though the testimony offered by the small business owner was offered in the context of the ICO, 
the owner’s request for the Council to “consider Chinatown and its people” attempted to broaden 
the scope of the ICO debate. In speaking directly to their family’s livelihood, the writer situated 
the ICO against the larger context of the people living and working in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
Furthermore, in presenting Chinatown as a neighborhood—with real people living and working 
in it—the small business owner contributed to a counter-narrative that focused on the stories of 
the people who would bear the brunt of Walmart’s entry into Chinatown and the concomitant 
changes that symbolic arrival might augur. Finally, the letter from the owner of Jenny Mai Fast 
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Food also marked a shift away from the rhetoric of desirability and a grounding of their story in 
one based on economic necessity and perhaps vulnerability. 
 
Nonprofit Industrial Complex & Walmart Funding 
 Notably, various Asian American nonprofit organizations in the greater Los Angeles area 
submitted written letters and testimony in opposition to the ICO over the next several months. 
Letters of opposition to the ICO came from nonprofit organizations that had received Walmart 
corporate contributions, including the Asian Business Association (ABA); Asian Pacific 
Community Fund (APCF); California Asian (Cal Asian) Chamber of Commerce; Korean 
Churches for Community Development (KCCD); Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. 
(LEAP); and Search to Involve Pilipino Americans (SIPA).125 Importantly, longtime business 
leaders in the Chinatown community—some of whom came from families that had helped 
establish New Chinatown in the 1930s—submitted letters of opposition, too. Letters of 
opposition were submitted by Wilson Gee and Al Soo-Hoo, for instance, both of whom came 
from families that had helped establish the Los Angeles Chinatown Corporation that had created 
the Central Plaza in New Chinatown in the 1930s. At the city level, pro-business groups like the 
Los Angeles County Business Federation also opposed the ICO.126 
In one letter, Michael Chee and Debra Fong of the Asian Pacific Community Fund 
(APCF) wrote that the ICO might “potentially create negative consequences for the future 
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positive development of Chinatown that cannot be foreseen.”127 Arguing that large retailers 
provide underserved communities with access to goods, Chee and Fong expressed their support 
against the “special interests backing this ICO [who] are not concerned with long term issues or 
the vital funding, jobs and economic revitalization they can create.”128 Chee and Fong went on to 
discuss Walmart’s corporate contributions to their organization: 
APCF commends our corporate partners for their contributions to our agency’s efforts. 
Walmart, for example, recently provided a significant grant of $75,000 to help fund our 
API Benefits Bank program which will help 67 families in the Chinese, Filipino, 
Japanese and Korean communities gain access to government and other benefits and 
subsidies. Verizon has provided our organization with $25,000 in scholarships for API 
students who are pursuing higher education in the science, technology, engineering and 
math related fields. Without major contributions and partnerships like these, our 
organization cannot have the vital impact we need to raise those less fortunate to a higher 
standard of living.129 
The letter from APCF highlighted the various dimensions of controversy that the Chinatown 
Walmart brought up in Los Angeles, including tensions that emerged in the Asian American 
nonprofit community in Los Angeles. Pro-business organizations as well as organizations that 
had accepted Walmart corporate contributions vocally supported Walmart and opposed the ICO. 
In one letter, the California Asian (Cal Asian) Chamber of Commerce stated that 
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the proposed ICO would create unnecessary layers and processes to ultimately ban 
investment in the Chinatown area of Los Angeles…there are immense opportunities for 
economic growth in Los Angeles; an ICO would only stifle investments and economic 
opportunity for businesses willing to invest in Chinatown. Furthermore, this ICO sets a 
poor precedent for economic development for other communities in Los Angeles.130 
The pro-business stance that the Cal Asian Chamber of Commerce took resounded with the pro-
business community throughout Los Angeles, with city-wide organizations like the Los Angeles 
Business Federation, which also came out in opposition to the proposed ICO. In yet another 
defense of Walmart’s corporate contributions to local nonprofit efforts, Wilson Gee made it clear 
that they supported the programmatic funding support from corporations like Walmart: 
[W]e need more corporate partners to help wit the necessary funding of our local 
programs, contribute to tax revenue and offer job opportunities to our residents. We need 
these partnerships so we can grow Chinatown into a vibrant economic community. 
 The proposed Interim Control Ordinance would negatively impact the economic 
development of Chinatown, and sets a bad precedent to others who want to do business in 
our community. For many years, Chinatown has wanted to revitalize our economy with 
more mainstream businesses operating here. With the recent economic downturn, that 
progress has stalled, but we see an optimistic future as the economy bounces back. Please 
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do not add unnecessary processes and procedures to an already tough Los Angeles 
business environment.131 
These written comments from the public sometimes featured sweeping, emphatic statements that 
suggested that these letters were less important for what they said and more important for who 
was saying it. In one instance, Dennis Huang, executive director of the Asian Business 
Association (ABA), wrote that the “vast majority of Chinatown residents and businesses do not 
support this ordinance and urge that it not be adopted.”132 The support of the “vast majority” of 
residents and businesses for the ICO was questionable for a number of reasons, including issues 
of language access to a majority community with limited English proficiency and the fact that 
the majority of responses from small businesses in Chinatown—reflected in the official log of 
documents—were in favor of the ICO. 
The written communications and testimony from the public provided in support of and 
opposition to the ICO adhered to narrow talking points—the impact on small businesses, the 
economic revitalization of Chinatown, the effects of a Walmart Neighborhood Market in and 
around Chinatown, and the potential economic impacts and precedent of the proposed ban on 
large retailers. Circumscribed by the vocabulary of the state and appeals to a market-oriented 
economic “common sense,” these arguments debated the ICO and the Chinatown Walmart on 
strictly economic terms. In turning out community residents, small business owners, and other 
supporters of the ICO to various hearings and City Council meetings, activists were able to 
engage the city processes and Walmart on the terms of the state. The strategy to turn out 
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hundreds of supporters and to submit more letters of support for the ICO engaged the state 
apparatus in a certain kind of way that was necessarily circumscribed by state practices but was 
still important to increasing visibility and to getting the testimony recorded as “official” evidence 
in the city archives. In doing so, activists adopted a communication style and messaging strategy 
that made themselves legible to the state—in some cases, literally, as Chinese terms needed to be 
translated.133  
The divisions in the Asian American nonprofit landscape that reveal themselves in the 
official city archives, particularly around the interim control ordinance hearings, came up in 
conversations with anti-Walmart groups and individuals who expressed disappointment in 
Walmart’s effectiveness in deploying divide-and-conquer tactics. As one CCED member 
discussed in an interview: 
What Walmart did was that they spent a lot of money giving to different nonprofits and 
other community groups, which helped to either neutralize their voice or actually 
[encourage them to] give support. So at the interim control ordinance hearing, there were 
a lot of groups which historically wouldn’t say anything, and they actually came and 
supported Walmart. So that shows you how money can help change things.134 
Walmart’s corporate contributions to various community-based nonprofit organizations served 
not only to censure their criticism but also to encourage their vocal support of the Chinatown 
Walmart location at various hearings for the interim control ordinance and in everyday 
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conversations. The funding strategy of Walmart in this case aligns with Daniel’s observation 
about “how money can help change things.”135 Moreover, the tactics here summon the specter of 
the nonprofit industrial complex in Los Angeles.136  
The dynamics of the nonprofit industrial complex play a prominent role in thinking 
through the campaign against Walmart in Los Angeles Chinatown, as it provides a lens through 
which to consider the roles of Walmart, the various community and labor organizations, and the 
state in contributing to the nonprofit industrial complex. In the essay, “The Political Logic of the 
Non-Profit Industrial Complex,” Dylan Rodriguez explores the close relationship between the 
emergence of the US prison industrial complex (PIC) and the non-profit industrial complex 
(NPIC), which he defines as “the industrialized incorporation of pro-state liberal and progressive 
campaigns and movements into a spectrum of government-proctored non-profit 
organizations.”137 Rodriguez argues that the emergence of a racialized carceral regime and the 
consolidation of an NPIC have shaped US-based resistance struggles within the constraints of 
manufactured, industrialized fear.138 More specifically, Rodriguez argues that the left/progressive 
NPIC’s investment in the “essential political logic of civil society” ultimately maintains, 
upholds, and even reproduces or amplifies—rather than resists and opposes—processes of state-
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sanctioned violence and co-optation of dissent.139 From the emergence of the state repression 
apparatus of COINTELPRO to the rise of foundations like the Mellon, Soros, and Ford 
Foundations, Rodriguez tracks the ways in which radical dissent were marginalized and 
incorporated into larger structures of domination.140 In the NPIC, Rodriguez writes, “the US state 
has found…a far less spectacular, generally demilitarized, and still highly effective apparatus of 
political discipline and repression that (to this point) has not provoked a significant critical mass 
of opposition or political outrage.”141 Rodriguez invokes Jennifer Wolch’s notion of a “shadow 
state” to characterize the ways in which the state continues to regulate non-profit and volunteer 
organizations from afar.142 
 In the case of the Walmart in Chinatown, the role of the state is less clearly that of the 
regulator of the nonprofit industrial complex. For example, the state’s role in issuing building 
permits might be indirectly interpreted to support private corporate actors like Walmart. What is 
clear are the more prominent roles that private actors like Walmart are taking in reinforcing the 
NPIC. These private actors are managing—or perhaps more insidiously, manipulating—the 
community organizations seeking funding streams within the NPIC. 
 
“Let Wal-Mart Have Chinatown” 
 On August 12, 2012, the Los Angeles Times published an editorial in support of Walmart 
and in opposition of the ICO. In the piece, titled “Let Wal-Mart Have Chinatown,” the Los 
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Angeles Times criticized the proposed ICO as “the latest iteration of a phenomenon that is 
crippling to the rational development of Los Angeles and its ability to create and sustain jobs.”143 
Furthermore, the Times criticized the City Council for its interventions: 
Rather than produce plans and then live by them, the City Council instead regularly 
intervenes to write special rules depending on the political circumstances. In the case of 
this project, the space at the intersection of Cesar E. Chavez and Grand avenues has been 
zoned for a grocery store for more than 20 years. It sits vacant today, and Wal-Mart 
proposes merely to comply with what the local zoning rules call for — a grocery store, 
one of about 33,000 square feet.144 
In invoking the notion of “the rational development of Los Angeles” and job creation, the 
editorial makes an appeal to a “commonsense” economic logic that solely considers the narrow 
scope of the debate around city zoning and whether Walmart complied with the rules that it 
needed to open up in Chinatown. In other words, the perceived rationality of a trajectory of 
development not only invoked a supposed linear progressive temporality to the city, it also 
categorized a certain mode of economic revitalization via corporate-driven business development 
as the commonsense path to addressing a long historical past of disinvestment in Chinatown. In 
the context of this argument, a “non-commonsense” approach would be one characterized by 
government intervention—one in which “the City Council…intervenes to write special rules 
depending on the political circumstances,” as the editorial reads. Furthermore, the Los Angeles 
Times extended its logic to govern what was “reasonable” to debate in this context: 
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The real issue behind this debate is organized labor’s antipathy toward the giant retailer. 
That too is understandable, as Wal-Mart has faced global criticism of its workplace 
practices and the demands it makes on its suppliers. But its treatment of Third World 
suppliers is tangential to the Chinatown proposal. As for the low wages and mediocre 
benefits it reportedly offers, those are issues to be taken up in another forum and in a 
manner that would affect all companies rather than just Wal-Mart.145 
In framing the scope of the debate to be solely about Chinatown, and in situating other 
considerations like exploitation in Walmart’s global supply chain as “tangential,” the editorial in 
the Times narrowed the discussion to Los Angeles. By setting the terms of “the real issues,” the 
fight over the Chinatown Walmart was contained domestically by the media in a manner similar 
to the messaging of the various people and groups that opposed the ICO. Mainstream media did 
not take seriously Walmart’s labor violations in the Global South. The labor and community 
groups mobilizing against the Chinatown Walmart would make these global connections. 
 
The Council Vote on the ICO 
The formula retail ICO never saw the approval of the Los Angeles City Council. On 
October 23, 2012, the ordinance failed in a 10-4 vote in the council. Because the ICO was 
introduced as an emergency motion, it needed 12 votes to pass in the council.146 By this time, 
Walmart had already received building permits from the Department of Building and Safety, 
                                                
145 Ibid. 
 
146 “LA City Council to Vote Again On Chinatown Large-Retailer Ban,” ABC7, October 23, 2012, 
http://abc7.com/archive/8856940/. 
 62 
begun construction, and started the hiring process.147 In fact, the Department of Building Safety 
had already approved building permits in March 2012 on the eve of the City Council’s 
discussion and vote on drafting the ICO. On November 7, 2012, the City Council referred the 
item back to the Planning and Land Use Management committee; the ICO would be sent back to 
the committee before the council file expired due to inaction in February 2015.148 
Even before the October vote, the ICO had to make it through the Planning and Land Use 
Management (PLUM) Committee. On July 12, 2012, the City Planning Commission voted 5-2 to 
disapprove the ICO.149 On August 14, 2012, the PLUM committee considered the draft ICO that 
would ban formula retail in Chinatown and listened to public comment from community 
members.150 On August 21, 2012, the PLUM committee—led by Councilmember Ed Reyes (CD 
1)—voted 2-1 to approve the ICO. The two “yes” votes came from Councilmembers Reyes (CD 
1) and José Huizar (CD 14); the “no” vote came from Councilmember Mitchell Englander (CD 
12).151 This 2-1 vote approved the ICO and allowed it to move onto the City Council for a vote 
by the entire Council. 
In the months leading up to the vote on October 23, 2012, the anti-Walmart campaign 
coalition identified several elected officials who were on the fence about the ICO: City 
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Councilmembers Jan Perry (CD 9), Joe Buscaino (CD 15), and Paul Krekorian (CD 2).152 The 
visibility of the anti-Walmart campaign, combined with the presence of organized labor in Los 
Angeles, compelled mayoral candidates to think twice about accepting campaign contributions 
from Walmart. In June 2012, Councilmember Eric Garcetti, City Controller Wendy Greuel, and 
Councilmember Jan Perry—all top contenders in the Los Angeles mayoral race—pledged they 
would not accept campaign contributions from Walmart.153 In July, Garcetti came under pressure 
for accepting a $100 campaign contribution from Javier Angulo, a senior-level Walmart 
executive, though his campaign staff was quick to make the distinction between corporate 
contributions from Walmart and individual contributions from its employees.154  
 In the 10-4 vote on October 23, 2012, the “yes” votes in favor of passing the ICO were 
submitted by Councilmembers Richard Alarcon (CD 7); José Huizar (CD 14); Eric Garcetti (CD 
13); Paul Koretz (CD 5); Paul Krekorian (CD 2); Tom LaBonge (CD 4); Ed Reyes (CD 1); Bill 
Rosendahl (CD 11); Herb Wesson (CD 10); and Dennis Zine (CD 3). The “no” votes were 
submitted by Councilmembers Joe Buscaino (CD 15); Mitchell Englander (CD 12); Bernard C. 
Parks (CD 8); and Jan Perry (CD 9). Councilmember Tony Cardenas (CD 6) was absent.155 
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Prior to the vote, Councilmember Alarcon (CD 7) voiced his support for the ICO and the 
opportunity it would provide for more information to be gathered about the potential impact of 
large retailers in Los Angeles Chinatown: 
You cannot tell me that you can place a Walmart in the middle of Chinatown, or at the 
gateway, as I said, and not impact the small businesses…We can prove that with a study. 
I think that we moved too quickly on the approvals of the Walmart originally and the 
entitlements—‘we’ meaning the city’s process, not us as a group. And I think sometimes, 
it takes leadership to take a time out and study things beyond what the process has been 
able to evaluate. And that’s what we’re doing here. An ICO will give us the opportunity 
to assess whether or not it’s going to have a negative impact on local businesses in the 
community.156 
Alarcon’s use of “we” to collectively refer to the city’s actors who granted the original permit 
approvals to Walmart—actors that were ostensibly distinct from the City Council deciding on the 
ICO—highlights the various actors that constitute the state. In the words of political economist 
Béatrice Hibou, the state is a complex, changing formation made up of various actors: 
Above all, the state is not univocal: the relations between state power, which is in a 
constant process of formation, and actors, social groups, and local communities are 
highly diverse and complex. Not only is it always possible for private actors to invent 
ways to circumvent obstacles; in addition, the use of intermediaries and collusion 
between public and private interests are not synonymous with harmonious and symbiotic 
relations: they do not prevent tense and conflictual relations among the parties. Indeed, I 
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have stressed how such conflictual relations and uncertainties are at the very heart of 
these arrangements.157 
Though Councilmember Alarcon in his comments expressed disagreement with the actions of the 
Department of Building and Safety in approving and issuing building permits to Walmart, his 
identification with city officials as a collective “we” served to highlight the diversity and 
complexity of the various people and groups that made up the “state” in the context of the 
decision-making processes behind the Chinatown Walmart. In addition, Alarcon’s comments, 
and the remarks of other members of the council who were generally in favor of the ICO, 
reflected voices that were not necessarily in “harmonious” agreement with Walmart’s entry into 
Chinatown but that demonstrated the “conflictual relations” that necessarily emerge here.158 
 Councilmember Garcetti also spoke in favor of passing the ICO, clarifying in his remarks 
that the debates around the ICO had set up a false dichotomy in pitting supporters of the ICO as 
“anti-business” and opponents of the ICO as “pro-business.”159 Garcetti grounded his support for 
the ICO in support for Councilmember Reyes and in trust of his ability to know the community’s 
issues best in his council district. He also clarified that the broader conversation about investing 
in infrastructure and economic growth is one that needed to happen separately from this debate 
around Walmart: “One store coming into one neighborhood that moves jobs from one place to 
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the next—and that most likely are going to be lower wage jobs with fewer benefits—is not a 
conversation about economic growth in this city.”160 
The opposing votes came from Councilmembers Perry, Englander, Parks, and Buscaino.   
Councilmembers Perry and Buscaino did not make any remarks at the October 23, 2012 meeting. 
Councilmember Englander cited “serious financial risk to the city as a whole” as a potential area 
of concern for the ICO. Englander also used the City Planning Commission’s findings to voice 
several questions and concerns about what the ICO might mean for business owners in Los 
Angeles generally and also for the City if it decided to revoke Walmart’s building permits at 
some future date.161 Councilmember Parks—one of the four councilmembers who voted against 
the measure—attributed the lack of grocery stores in his district (which included western 
portions of South Central Los Angeles) to efforts targeting big-box, non-union retailers like 
Walmart.162 As Parks said in his remarks during the meeting, “We are being held hostage over 
these philosophical views, and particularly, this age-old discussion about high benefits, high 
wages,” speaking specifically of the pro-labor views and sentiments—held by the anti-Walmart 
forces—against large non-union retailers.163 Parks, a former Los Angeles Police Department 
chief who had fought the police union, had established himself as a strong voice against the pull 
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of organized labor in the city since his election to the City Council in 2003.164 In 2004, when 
Walmart was at the center of the debates around new city ordinances designed to prohibit 
Walmart Supercenters from opening up within Los Angeles’ city limits, Parks emerged as a 
vocal opponent to the bans and encouraged the entry of Walmart and other willing businesses 
into his district.165 The Los Angeles Times noted that the 2004 city ordinance—which aimed to 
“prohibit stores with more than 100,000 square feet that devote more than 10% of their inventory 
to nontaxable food and drugs in areas of the city designated as economic assistance zones, which 
cover about 60% of the city”—was designed to effectively prohibit Walmart’s Supercenters from 
coming into Los Angeles.166 The 2004 ordinance to proscribe these superstores was drafted by 
Councilmembers Eric Garcetti and Ed Reyes, who later backed the motion to introduce the 
formula retail ICO in March 2012 and voted in favor of the ICO in October 2012.167 In the 
discussion leading up to the vote, Parks emphasized the importance of focusing on jobs and 
access to healthy food: 
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The issue is, there’s groceries that are needed. It’s [Chinatown’s] a food desert. There’s 
businesses needed, there’s taxes that will be paid, or do we benefit by having that vacant 
store for another thirty years while we quibble about what brand goes on the door?168 
In his remarks at the City Council meeting, Parks seemed to draw from the messaging promoted 
by proponents of the Chinatown Walmart, which characterized Chinatown as a food desert with 
little to no access to healthy and affordable groceries.  
The claim that Chinatown was a food desert had emerged from Walmart representatives 
and business advocacy organizations in the months leading up to the City Council vote on the 
ICO in March 2012. When asked about the food desert rhetoric, Walmart media representative 
Rachel Wall explained to Sukjong Hong of Open City Magazine, “We use the word, 
‘underserved.’ There is no traditional full-service grocery store in downtown, according to the 
LA Chamber of Commerce.”169 As I previously discussed, the food desert narrative quickly 
became one challenged by community activists in the neighborhood and the labor-community 
coalition that formed to fight the Chinatown Walmart Neighborhood Market. In fact, according 
to a map developed according to the definition of “food desert” from the United States 
Department of Agriculture, Los Angeles Chinatown was not a food desert.170 
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 When the proposed ICO did not garner the necessary votes for approval at the City 
Council meeting on October 23, 2012, the council voted to reconsider the ICO at a future date.171 
The next day, on October 24, 2012, Councilmember Reyes asked to “withhold unanimous 
consent” on the ordinance, which functionally tabled the vote on the ICO for one week.172 One 
week later, on October 31, 2012, the agenda item was continued for another week. On November 
7, 2012, Councilmember Reyes requested a referral back to the Planning and Land Use 
Management Committee; after the City Council referred the ICO back to the committee, the 
ordinance never made it back to the council for a second vote.173  
 
The Building and Safety Appeal — Case No. DIR 2012-1353 (BSA) 
On March 22, 2012—one day before the City Council was set to vote on whether to 
proceed with the ICO motion—the Los Angeles Department of Building and Safety (LADBS) 
issued building permits for Walmart to begin construction at the Chinatown location.174 On 
March 29, 2012, the Los Angeles chapter of the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance 
(APALA-LA) filed an appeal to the city, claiming that the Los Angeles Department of Building 
and Safety had wrongly issues building permits for Walmart to proceed with construction in 
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Chinatown. On December 20, 2012, city zoning administrator Maya Zaitzevsky released a city 
report denying the appeal and finding that the Department of Building and Safety correctly 
issued building permits to Walmart to begin work on the Chinatown store location on Cesar 
Chavez Avenue.175  
In the body of the appeal, the three reasons that APALA-LA cited were (1) the proposed 
Walmart did not comply with prior zoning and redevelopment conditions for the Chinatown 
location; (2) the City needed to review prior zoning and redevelopment approvals prior to the 
issuing of the building permits; and (3) given new, unanalyzed impacts and information, 
supplemental environmental review was needed. An analysis of the city documents upholding 
the city’s issuance of building permits and Walmart’s construction at the Chinatown store 
location reveals the ways in which the logics and grammars of city planning decisions are often 
narrowly limited in scope, often by the technical, rules-oriented dimensions of highly precise 
complaints and grievances. Though these technical, legal complaints occurred in the context of 
much larger debates around the entry of Walmart into Chinatown, the reduced, limited scope of 
the complaints like the appeal against the Department of Building and Safety limited the ground 
on which labor and community activists could wage their campaign against Walmart. Despite all 
of this, activists recognized the importance of fighting on multiple fronts, and they took Walmart 
to task where they could in the legal and city planning arenas. 
According to the December 2012 report by Zeitzevsky, the city zoning administration 
delimited the decision they could make, and in doing so, narrowed the scope of their verdict: 
The appeal is restricted to determining whether the Department of Building and Safety 
acted within the scope of its authority as provided in the applicable sections of the Los 
                                                
175 Case No. DIR 2012-1353(BSA), page 6, report by Maya Zeitzevsky, Associate Zoning Administrator, 
December 29, 2012, Los Angeles City Archives, Office of the City Clerk. Los Angeles, CA, 
https://cityclerk.lacity.org/lacityclerkconnect/index.cfm?fa=ccfi.viewrecord&cfnumber=12-0382. 
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Angeles Municipal Code cited herein and that the Department did not commit an error or 
abuse of discretion in its determination to issue Building Permit Nos. 11016-10000-
23202 and 11016-10000-23204, and not stopping the work for the proposed tenant 
improvements of the grocery store and pharmacy at the existing retail spaces located at 
701 West Cesar Chavez Avenue, Suite Nos. 101 and 102.176 
The decision of the zoning administrator defined the parameters to strictly consider the actions of 
the Department of Building and Safety. As the report noted, “no responses are required regarding 
the appellant’s contentions of error and abuse of discretion on behalf of CRA/LA or Designated 
Local Authority staff.”177 In the report, the zoning administrator restricted the purview of the 
appeal decision to the building permits and whether they were properly issued to Walmart. 
 
Legal Challenges to Walmart and the City of Los Angeles 
The legal strategy of the anti-Walmart campaign did not stop with the failure of the ICO. 
Though the ICO failed to stop Walmart’s construction on the Chinatown store and then failed to 
muster enough votes among the City Councilmembers to pass, labor and community groups 
opposed to the Chinatown Walmart did not stop the fight on the legal front. 
On July 3, 2012, APALA and United Food and Commercial Workers (UFCW) Union 
Local 770 jointly filed a lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, alleging that the Los Angeles 
City Department of Building and Safety “failed to notify the public of its decision to issue a 
Notice of Exemption (NOE), which allows Walmart to move forward on its Chinatown project 
                                                
176 Case No. DIR 2012-1353(BSA), page 17. 
 
177 Case No. DIR 2012-1353(BSA), page 18. 
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without environmental review.”178 The legal challenge—Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance 
et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al.—also requested a restraining order on construction at the 
Chinatown location. On September 7, 2012, Los Angeles County Superior Court Judge James 
Chalfant refused to grant a restraining order on construction.179 On November 20, 2012, Los 
Angeles County Superior Court Judge James Chalfant again refused to grant an injunction to 
stop construction on the Chinatown Walmart store; Chalfant found no evidence of irreparable 
environmental harm from the ongoing Walmart construction.180 
The debate over whether the building permits were properly issued to Walmart to begin 
construction on the Chinatown store without a public hearing continued when, on April 4, 2013, 
SEACA and APALA filed a lawsuit against various Los Angeles City agencies. As the initial 
lawsuit reads, 
By this action, Petitioners/Plaintiffs Southeast Asian Community Alliance and Asian 
Pacific American Labor Alliance (collectively “Petitioners”) challenge the unlawful 
actions of the City of Los Angeles, its Departments and agencies (“City”), and its 
CRA/LA, a Designated Local Authority (“DLA”), in purporting to authorize building 
permits for a new Wal-Mart grocery store and pharmacy in Chinatown’s Grand Plaza, 
                                                
178 Aiha Nguyen, “Lawsuit Challenges City’s Action on Walmart Chinatown Store,” Capital and Main, 
July 5, 2012, http://capitalandmain.com/lawsuit-challenges-citys-actions-on-walmart-chinatown-store. 
The case was Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., case number 
BS138164, in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles. 
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Walmart,” CBS LA, September 7, 2012, http://losangeles.cbslocal.com/2012/09/07/judge-denies-motion-
to-halt-construction-on-chinatown-walmart/.  
 
180 “Judge again refuses to block Wal-Mart construction in L.A. Chinatown,” Los Angeles Times, 
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without presenting said permits to the DLA Board or other City agency Board for 
approval before permit issuance as required by law, and without enforcing mitigation 
conditions necessary to protect the environment as required by the California 
Environment Quality Act (“CEQA”). In reliance on the improperly-issued permits, Real 
Party in Interest Wal-Mart has almost completed construction of its proposed grocery 
store, and is on the verge of opening as soon as the City issues a Certificate of 
Occupancy. If the City does so and the new store opens, Petitioners, the community, and 
the public will be permanently deprived, inter alia, of their lawful right to have their 
concerns about the permits presented to and considered at a duly-noticed public meeting 
before permit issuance.181 
The lawsuit, Southeast Asian Community Alliance et al. v. City of Los Angeles et al., was a legal 
challenge using a petition for a writ of administrative mandate—that is, it asked for the Superior 
Court to review and reverse the administrative decision of the City of Los Angeles to issue 
building permits to Walmart to begin construction at the Chinatown store. The primary argument 
in the legal challenge centered on the defendants’ failure to comply with the terms of the 
California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA). At the time of this lawsuit, Gideon Kracov, the 
land use attorney representing the defendants, had already helped to file a similar legal challenge 
against a Walmart in Torrance; in 2012 and 2013, Kracov was concurrently engaged in a legal 
challenge to a proposed Walmart in Burbank, and he would later go on to work on a similar 
environmental lawsuit against a Walmart SuperCenter proposed for El Monte.182 
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Conclusion 
Supporters and opponents to the Walmart Neighborhood Market in Chinatown fought to 
garner public support in terms of the battles arbitrated by city officials and the courts. Walmart 
proponents and business advocacy groups spoke out against the ICO in front of City Council, 
warning of the precedent it would set for businesses, and filed briefs defending the processes that 
Walmart went through to secure building permits. Labor and community organizations and 
activists opposed to the Chinatown Walmart recognized the need to respond on multiple fronts. 
Accordingly, the anti-Walmart coalition—which included a group of Chinatown-based activists 
who would eventually form Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED)—
mobilized those residents and small business owners who did not support Walmart’s entry into 
Chinatown to sign letters and offer public comment in favor of the ICO and against Walmart. In 
addition, they used legal strategies to fight Walmart’s entry into Chinatown, appealing the 
issuance of building permits to Walmart and then filing a lawsuit against the city for authorizing 
those permits without proper review. 
                                                                                                                                                       
Gabriel Valley Tribune, January 20, 2016, http://www.sgvtribune.com/general-news/20160120/future-el-
monte-walmart-faces-legal-obstacle-from-environmental-lawsuit.  
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Chapter Three 
Walmart, Chinatown Community for Equitable Development, and Organizing in Los Angeles 
Chinatown 
 
If you’ve been following media coverage of the battle over Walmart’s proposed store in 
Chinatown, you probably have the impression that the fight is between the retail giant 
and labor. Chinatown leaders have been largely absent from press reports of the 
controversy, and to the extent they are mentioned one would think they want Walmart in 
their neighborhood. Thursday’s hearing at the L.A. City Planning Commission should set 
the record straight — Chinatown doesn’t want Walmart, and residents and business 
owners are loud and clear about it for anyone who is paying attention.183 
—Aiha Nguyen 
 
As Aiha Nguyen wrote in her online piece in Capital and Main, and as I have 
demonstrated in the previous chapters, the campaign against Walmart cannot simply be reduced 
to a fight between the world’s largest retailer and organized labor in Los Angeles—though the 
Walmart and the unions certainly engaged each other. Instead, the anti-Walmart campaign was 
one waged in various theaters and with a wide array of stakeholders in Chinatown and across Los 
Angeles. In addition to the coverage in the mainstream press, journalistic accounts of the 
Chinatown Walmart contestation appeared in online media. Additionally, with the emergence of 
a coalition of labor and community groups opposed to the Walmart, activists brought 
conversations around Walmart and its poor labor practices onto the streets of Chinatown. All of 
these discussions happening in different places around the Chinatown Walmart were amplified 
by the networks of organized labor in Los Angeles and also by workers themselves, including 
members from OUR Walmart, an organization of Walmart workers throughout Los Angeles 
County who were organizing to improve their working conditions.184 
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In this chapter, I first outline the chronology of the formation of Chinatown Community 
for Equitable Development (CCED) in response to the news of the Walmart Neighborhood 
Market in Chinatown. I then examine interviews with various CCED members who had been 
involved in the Chinatown Walmart campaign.185 The study of CCED’s role in the Walmart 
campaign is significant for several reasons. CCED dedicated themselves to grassroots organizing 
efforts. Limited in funding and resources, CCED creatively activated the people, energy, and 
skills of its members; mobilized existing connections in the Chinatown community and Los 
Angeles more broadly; and built new relationships to organize the Chinatown community against 
the Walmart Neighborhood Market.186 
 
Genealogies: Chinese Progressive Association – San Gabriel Valley and Earlier Formations 
While CCED appeared to have solely responded to the threat of Chinatown Walmart and 
to the advent of a corporate-led gentrification in the neighborhood, it fulfilled the desires of a 
                                                
185 I would like to note here that the CCED members who served as my interlocutors in this chapter 
graciously reviewed a draft of this thesis and provided immensely useful feedback. Though I did my best 
to incorporate this feedback where possible, I want to acknowledge that the retelling of CCED’s 
formation in this chapter provides only a partial retelling that is shaped by the distribution of 
interlocutors’ voices. In its current form, this chapter is, in many ways, a re-narration “in becoming” of 
the formation of CCED—one that would benefit greatly from additional interviews with many of the 
other founding members of CCED and more consideration of the distribution of quotations and voices in 
such a re-telling. Interviews with these other founding members of CCED, many of whom were women, 
would not only provide a narrative that unfolds differently along gender lines, they would also likely 
reveal the heterogeneity that characterized the perspectives among CCED’s founding membership. 
Notably, the narratives presented in this chapter reveals CCED to center primarily around a politics of 
Chinese-ness, though additional interviews would likely reveal a different analysis of Chinatown as 
multiracial and multiethnic; that is, CCED organizers had a complex analysis that envisioned organizing a 
Chinatown that was Cambodian, Latino, and Chinese. I hope that future iterations of the work in this 
chapter will be able to fill out this narrative along these not insignificant dimensions. Thank you to Preeti 
Sharma for this sharp insight and feedback. 
 
186 Similarly, Glen Ikuo Kitayama notes the grassroots organizing approach of the NCRR (at its founding, 
the Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress) as the distinguishing characteristic for the organization in his 
case study. See Glen Ikuo Kitayama, Japanese Americans and the Movement for Redress: A Case Study 
of Grassroots Activism in the Los Angeles Chapter of the National Coalition for Redress/Reparations 
(MA thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 1993). 
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generation of younger activists who were looking to build with other left/progressive Chinese 
Americans. Far before Walmart announced its plans to open shop in Chinatown, young Chinese 
Americans in Los Angeles recognized the need for a left/progressive formation dedicated to 
building left/progressive spaces for Chinese Americans. Daniel Huynh, who came from a family 
of working-class ethnic Chinese Vietnamese boat refugees who had found their way to the 
United States, was born in Chinatown.187 As Daniel Huynh noted in an interview, 
There were two things that happened [to help with the creation of CCED]. One was that 
the Chinese Progressive Association of the San Gabriel Valley [CPA-SGV] closed its 
doors—or at least it was sun setting. There was another group, the Chinatown Collective 
for Community Action.188 There was an ebb and flow of the creation of organizations. 
There was also a study group that took place. Just for a while, people were trying to 
create this space for activists in Chinatown, and it was hard to make it happen.189 
Indeed, various efforts to bring Chinese American progressive activists together in the Los 
Angeles area predated, and perhaps set the conditions for, the creation of CCED in March 2012. 
As early as 2006, activists who had already been involved in different community 
organizations that engaged in affordable housing, labor rights, youth work, and other issues in 
Los Angeles came together to form an all-volunteer chapter of the Chinese Progressive 
Association in the San Gabriel Valley. Since its inception, the Chinese Progressive Association – 
San Gabriel Valley (CPA-SGV) sought to build a worker-led grassroots organization of low-
wage Chinese workers in the San Gabriel Valley while also providing a space to build a network 
                                                
187 Daniel Huynh, interview by the author, Los Angeles, CA, May 11, 2016. 
 
188 The Chinatown Collective for Community Action preceded CPA-SGV by two or three years. Daniel 
Huynh, in discussion with the author, October 5, 2016. 
 
189 Daniel Huynh, interview by the author, Los Angeles, CA, May 11, 2016. 
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of progressive Chinese Americans.190 With the support and fiscal sponsorship of the Garment 
Worker Center, CPA-SGV chose to organize in the San Gabriel Valley “because of the large 
number of low-wage Chinese workers concentrated there and the lack of organizing from a 
political, class-based perspective.”191 For the next five years, CPA-SGV remained an all-
volunteer effort as it surveyed workers, hosted workers’ rights workshops, and regularly 
outreached to supermarket and restaurant workers. In 2011, CPA-SGV decided to end its 
Chinese worker organizing project due to limited capacity, citing as contributing factors a 
shortage of bilingual and bicultural organizers, a lack of accountability within an all-volunteer 
structure, inconsistent participation, and a dearth of organizers who consistently interacted with 
first-generation Chinese immigrants. 
The decision to wrap up the worker organizing efforts of CPA-SGV did not diminish the 
desire among these and other activists to build a space for progressive Chinese Americans. In 
January 2012, a few months after CPA-SGV closed out its worker organizing project, two former 
members of CPA-SGV convened an informal gathering—a “Chinese progressives dumpling 
night”—of progressive Chinese Americans to discuss urgent political issues for Chinese 
Americans in Los Angeles, to assess the need for a progressive Chinese American organization, 
and to think about what a progressive Chinese American community would entail.192 One month 
later, in February 2012, the same group planned a follow-up gathering—this time, a “Chinese 
                                                
190 Chinese Progressive Association – San Gabriel Valley (CPA-SGV), “CPA San Gabriel Valley Ceases 
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progressives potluck night.”193 These informal meetings provided a scaffolding for Chinese 
Americans to come together to form CCED when news of the Chinatown Walmart came the 
same month. Daniel Huynh recalled these efforts, remembering that 
We had brought people together in different ways. I remember one time, for Lunar New 
Year, we had invited a lot of Chinese American activists to come together and meet and 
talk shop and see what’s going on. At the same time, we heard that Walmart was trying to 
move into Chinatown. I think it helped us step on the gas to get things going.194 
Though these early, informal Chinese American progressive gatherings did not, as Daniel 
mentioned, “have an active campaign” in mind, that would change soon enough. By the time 
Walmart’s plans to open a store in Chinatown were made public in late February 2012, these 
Chinese American activists had already been discussing the need for progressive Chinese 
American activist spaces.195 The response to news of the Walmart Chinatown was swift from 
community activists, organizations, and media outlets alike. 
 
CCED Origin Stories: Getting Together 
 The various people who came together to form CCED had their own experiences and 
stakes in Los Angeles Chinatown, though a core of the people organizing knew each other from 
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their previous schooling or from their work in Los Angeles nonprofits and labor organizations. 
Preeti Sharma and Sophia Cheng, for example, had met through various organizational meetings 
in their prior organizing involvements with South Asian Network and Southeast Asian 
Community Alliance (SEACA), respectively.196 Daniel Huynh, one of the co-founders of CCED, 
had studied urban planning at UCLA with Aiha Nguyen, who in 2012 was a veteran researcher at 
Los Angeles Alliance for a New Economy (LAANE).197 King Cheung, a retired California State 
Deputy Labor Commissioner, arrived with ties to the Asian Pacific American Labor Alliance and 
came with experience as a participant in the 1995 El Monte Thai garment worker raids. 
Additionally, Shiu-Ming Cheer, Craig Wong, and Linda Lam had been involved with CPA-SGV. 
Furthermore, many people had existing activist or progressive tendencies, and they often also 
had longtime stakes and investments in Los Angeles Chinatown.  
The people who I interviewed for this thesis offer a representative array of the people 
who joined CCED over the course of the Walmart campaign. The interviews also demonstrated 
the varying stakes and relationships that CCED members had with Los Angeles Chinatown as a 
place. On the younger end of the CCED membership during the “No Walmart in Chinatown” 
campaign, for example, was Jenny Chhea. The daughter of a Chinese Cambodian refugee family, 
Jenny was an undergraduate student at UCLA at the time that she heard about and became 
involved in the anti-Walmart campaign. In Jenny’s words, “Knowing that Chinatown is where I 
shopped throughout my childhood, and knowing how a big retail store would affect Chinatown 
and the small mom-and-pop shops are what made me have passion for it.”198 In another case, Jon 
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197 At the time of the writing of this thesis, Aiha Nguyen is director of the Grocery and Retail Project at 
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 81 
Truong—who has Chinese Vietnamese roots—was an undergraduate at the University of 
Southern California when he first got involved with CPA – SGV; later, after graduating, he 
gravitated toward CCED, where he already knew several of the activists who had been a part of 
the earlier formation in San Gabriel Valley.199 In yet another instance, Alice Tse was a recent 
graduate of UC Berkeley who had moved back to her hometown of Los Angeles (more 
specifically, Elysian Park) at the time that she got involved in the anti-Walmart campaign with a 
former high school classmate.200 Sophat Phea, a Cambodian resident in Chinatown, was in his 
mid-twenties when he joined CCED in early 2012. He had been working with SEACA through 
the organization’s youth program, and his connections to many young people in Los Angeles 
Chinatown proved to be useful in the campaign’s mobilization efforts later on.201 
In addition to the college students and recent graduates, the original formation of CCED 
also included a group of marginally older people, some of whom were professional organizers 
(i.e., with experience working with various left/progressive organizations, such as Restaurant 
Opportunities Center – Los Angeles or the UCLA Labor Center). For example, Sarah Tseng was 
a graduate student in urban planning at UCLA in early 2012 when CCED first formed; she was 
also living in Los Angeles Chinatown. Nat Lowe was also a graduate student in the urban 
planning master’s program at UCLA, and he attended his first CCED meeting when Sarah had 
invited him.202 Sophia Cheng was a second year Asian American Studies master’s student at 
UCLA. Preeti Sharma was a graduate student at UCLA in gender studies in early 2012, and she 
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had a background in left/progressive Asian American organizing in Los Angeles.203 At the time 
of the founding of CCED in 2012, Daniel Huynh was a member of the Chinatown Kung Fu and 
Lion Dance Troupe.204 Daniel was working with an affordable housing nonprofit at the time that 
CCED formed in early 2012, though he had had previous jobs working with youth in Chinatown 
through the Chinatown Service Center.205 In fact, as a high school student, Alice had participated 
in a youth program facilitated by Daniel.206 Though they were not interviewed for this thesis, 
Lucia Lin, Cathy Dang, and Sophia Cheng—all Chinese American woman organizers in Los 
Angeles at the time working with different organizations—actively helped in founding CCED.207 
The older guard of CCED—consisting of people who had already retired or who were 
nearing retirement—had been involved in the Asian American Movement in Los Angeles in 
different capacities.208 Diane Tan—a retired administrative law judge who has worked, visited, 
and volunteered in Chinatown during the past several decades—had been involved in organizing 
efforts in Los Angeles Chinatown as part of Asian Americans for Equality (AAFE), a 
membership organization that emerged to address community concerns and issues in Chinatown 
during the Asian American Movement.209 King Cheung, Diane’s husband and a retired deputy 
labor commissioner for the state of California by profession, had also been involved in AAFE, as 
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well as with community organizing efforts in the early 1970s to demand that Resthaven 
Community Mental Health Center—the only mental health facility in Chinatown—provide in-
language and culturally competent services to residents in the community.210 Phyllis Chiu was a 
retired elementary school teacher; she had taught at Castelar Elementary School in Chinatown 
and had also gotten involved in various organizing efforts during the Asian American 
Movement.211 By the time she joined CCED, Phyllis—who had also been involved in AAFE in 
the 1970s—had already had many years’ experience of working with people in Chinatown 
around various community issues. She explained: 
The late 70s was the time of the New Left movement, so a lot of people got into all the 
different New Left groups, and so the community work died down a little bit because 
people were into studying, political study, and doing all kinds of things—some people 
went into factories and did work organizing workers and stuff. I had always stayed at 
Castelar and always did things around the community…So after a while, everybody did 
New Left stuff, and that kind of dropped. But we were still doing work with parents in 
the school, and we had different things we needed to organize the parents around. So I 
stayed active, and we did a lot of stuff with our teachers’ union, UTLA, and then also 
issues where the parents needed support, like for getting Castelar off of year-round 
schools. And then, I didn’t do much for a while, and I retired. Then I get a call from King 
[Cheung], he said, there’s a group of young people who are really active now. I had seen 
on Facebook some of my former students had been posting things about Walmart, and I 
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said, that’s interesting, I heard about Walmart from some of my former students, and 
King said, yeah, you should come to one of these meetings. So I went to one at Alpine – 
and Sophia [Cheng] and Lucia [Lin] were chairing the meeting, and I think Daniel was 
there, and Linda Lam. And that’s how I got to know people and how it all started.212 
Other members came from Movement backgrounds not necessarily solely based in Los Angeles; 
for example, Craig Wong had been part of the CPA – SGV formation and had been active during 
the Asian American Movement in the International Hotel struggle in the San Francisco Bay 
Area.213 All of these more senior members of CCED brought past organizing experience to the 
early formation of CCED in 2012.  
Many CCED members had existing relationships with Los Angeles Chinatown—as 
former and current residents, as previous organizers in Chinatown, or as people who recognized 
the need to serve the immigrant, people of color, and working-class communities there. For 
example, Jenny Chhea discussed her own connections to Chinatown: 
Growing up, I remember shopping there and eating there. For me, I associated Chinatown 
with not so great memories because of our socioeconomic status. After I moved to 
Rosemead, Chinatown became the retail place for me to find cheap food. After I got to 
college, it’s home to me in a different way now.214 
Similarly, Daniel recalled his early memories of Chinatown as a vibrant community for working 
class Chinese immigrants: 
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I remember when the streets were so packed on Saturdays, you would pretty much go 
shoulder to shoulder. People getting their groceries, people who had to go to the doctor—
it was a place in which a lot of Chinese found home…I still hold Chinatown dear to my 
heart as a port of entry for people to be able to sustain themselves in the United States.215 
Alice felt similarly: 
Even though I didn’t live there [in Chinatown], I identified as one of the community 
members because I went there a lot growing up. I remember walking down the street with 
my dad, and we would go through the stores and people would recognize [my dad].216 
Although she had grown up understanding Chinatown as a community of and for working-class 
Chinese immigrants, she also appreciated its role in providing resources for working class 
immigrants as with the diverse demographics of Latinos and Cambodians. Her mom had gotten 
her first job through the Chinatown Service Center, and so Alice understood Chinatown as a site 
with connections to job training, social services, and other resources for immigrants.217 King 
Cheung mentioned his existing relationship with Los Angeles Chinatown at the time that he got 
involved in the anti-Walmart campaign: 
So I got to know the people, I got to know the activists [in Chinatown], I met Diane 
[through AAFE during the 1970s]. It was like home for me for about ten years…Right 
now, I feel more like an outsider because I don’t work here in Chinatown like in the old 
days. But at the same time, because of the previous experiences, I felt like that, even 
though I’m not working or residing in Chinatown, it’s a place that I treasure. If it was just 
Monterey Park or some place like that, I don’t have that kind of connection. Things 
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happened here—my mom, Diane, friends—you know, a lot of the friends that I have in 
Chinatown.218 
Speaking to his connections to the neighborhood—including his experiences of his mom living 
and working as a garment worker in Chinatown, meeting his future partner Diane in Chinatown, 
and organizing with residents through AAFE during the 1970s—King invoked a distinct sense of 
place and nostalgia that established his motivations to join the anti-Walmart campaign. 
Though Walmart was ostensibly the huge catalyst that launched CCED, the concerns of 
the organization and the organizing work in Chinatown went beyond the issue of Walmart. As 
Alice mentioned in an interview, “[CCED] is not just a single-issue organization. [It] can build 
its base here and organize in Chinatown so that the next time something like this comes around, 
CCED will be ready and will have built relationships in the community.”219 Even after the 
Walmart fight, CCED recognized that key community concerns, including affordable housing 
and good schools for the families in Chinatown, would require long-term organizing in the 
community. Daniel remembered the goals for sustainable, long-term change for Los Angeles 
Chinatown that CCED had articulated at the beginning of the campaign against Walmart in 
Chinatown. For Daniel, “[e]veryone envisioned that this is a community, and we need to 
somehow sustain that. That’s the identity we tried to upkeep.”220 
Finally, the community and relationship building in CCED created not only a feeling of 
urgency around the social movement work but also cultivated belonging and a desire to work 
together with similar-minded people. As Preeti discussed, 
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We were meeting every week, maybe every other week…there was a lot of excitement in 
that room. Scott Chan brought particular skills. Daniel Huynh brought his own drive and 
passion. Sarah Tseng also brought her experience [in urban planning]. Sophia, having had 
her organizing with CPA in San Gabriel Valley [CPA-SGV], brought that with her. 
Phyllis, who had been involved in organizing in Chinatown decades earlier, brought that 
with her. So that was really powerful to see people with skills particularly designed for 
organizing.221 
Preeti’s comments underscored the importance of the organizing skill sets that different people 
brought to CCED when it first coalesced around the proposed Walmart in Chinatown. Because 
some CCED members had had experience in door-to-door outreach and relational, one-on-one 
organizing, and others had a deep experiential understanding of community concerns and issues 
in Chinatown since the 1970s, CCED strategically mobilized its members’ expertise and 
networks for varying purposes in the campaign against Walmart. Preeti noted that, in addition to 
bringing various skills to the organizing efforts, CCED members actively built meaningful social 
relationships with one another.222 In a similar manner, Alice remembered the group as both 
welcoming and appealing with respect to their organizing models: 
Even when I first went to the meetings, I felt like the people were hella cool and they’re 
funny and smart too. The working style was very special. There was a good working 
dynamic and you can feel this when you enter into a room where people are energized 
and engaged. They’re organized too — with a facilitator, timekeeper, notetaker. These 
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are the signs of an effective, meaningful, and intentional meeting. We did a lot of 
community building too.223 
The sense of family and community created across generations of activists was palpable. Some 
participants in CCED had been involved in the Asian American Movement and other social 
movement organizing, and they brought a depth of organizing experience to CCED from the 
beginning. Additionally, this sense of community facilitated an intergenerational learning 
exchange experience for both older and younger activists. 
As Daniel recalled, “We’ve always been intergenerational, and we’ve always been a 
family, and I don’t think those values have changed that much. Though the composition has 
changed, people’s dedication and the resources has been so present.”224 Speaking to the 
intergenerational dimension of CCED, King Cheung, Diane Tan, and Phyllis Chiu—some of the 
more senior organizers—commented on the power of younger and older people working 
together. “If it wasn’t for the younger people getting involved,” Diane Tan notes, “[building an 
increasingly visible and apparent opposition to Walmart in Chinatown] would have been 
harder.”225 
 
Experimental Activisms: Reimagining Tactics and Organizing Creatively in CCED 
CCED’s work to organize Chinatown residents and small business owners against the 
Chinatown Walmart did not stop with the the interim control ordinance or the various legal 
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challenges that groups filed in the Los Angeles County Superior Court.226 Oftentimes, the 
organizing approach of CCED concentrated less on the legal and city-wide strategy and more on 
building relationships with small business owners and residents. Because this may have differed 
from the typical Alinsky-esque community organizing model that the Los Angeles Alliance for a 
New Economy (LAANE) and the unions frequently deployed, CCED’s work took on a different, 
more organic, and grassroots character.227 As Daniel mentioned, “we [CCED] were looking to 
sustain ourselves and create our identity separate from LAANE and other organizations.”228 
The local organizing efforts in the anti-Walmart campaign focused primarily on small 
businesses and secondarily on residents. The organizing also mobilized multi-pronged arguments 
that noted Walmart’s poor labor practices and role in using suppliers. Additionally, many CCED 
members noted the organic and experimental quality that seemed to resonate throughout CCED’s 
work in the anti-Walmart campaign. Early on in the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign, 
members of CCED organized various events as they thought of the ideas, and that experimental 
and creative energy seemed electric. As Daniel mentioned, 
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There were a lot of things that people weren’t afraid to try, and that’s kind of the spirit 
that I miss. I feel like we’re more structured now. We had put together a CCED bike 
tour—which Nat [Lowe] put together actually—and we invited a lot of people to 
Chinatown who didn’t know about the issues.229 
The bike tour, which was a six to seven mile bike ride around Chinatown and the downtown Los 
Angeles area, began at Alpine Recreation Center and featured a community-led, political tour 
that focused on community issues in the Chinatown area.230 Other creative, experimental tactics 
that emerged from CCED members during the anti-Walmart campaigns included the Friday night 
vigils, which were weekly Friday actions that took place on the corner of Cesar Chavez and 
Grand Avenues outside the proposed Walmart location in Chinatown. Diane remembered the 
engagement in these weekly actions: 
The Friday night vigils were good in terms of encouraging more people to get involved 
and showing that it’s important to voice objections in different ways. It also brought a lot 
more college and high school students to Chinatown, and more younger people started 
getting involved.231 
CCED’s organizing efforts also made their way to college and university campuses, where 
professors invited CCED members to share their work in Los Angeles Chinatown and recruit 
college students. For example, Glenn Omatsu invited CCED to do a presentation at UCLA, and 
professors at California State University, Los Angeles, did the same.232 By doing so, more people 
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became aware of the problem and started joining CCED’s efforts in Chinatown. The importance 
of the campaign appeared to resonate with students, as Diane noted. In her words, “[a] lot of it 
had to do with the people that became involved in CCED. They were connected to the college 
campuses” and mobilized support for these issues on those campuses.233 Notably, too, the 
organizing efforts of the anti-Walmart coalition in Chinatown raised the visibility of the 
controversy and brought the discussion into the Chinese and Spanish language press.234 
Daniel also mentioned planning for a CCED-driven “shop local” campaign designed to 
build the visibility of small businesses in Chinatown. CCED members wanted to encourage 
people to shop local and patronize the existing small businesses that might potentially be hurt in 
the wake of Walmart’s entry into the neighborhood. The initiatives sought to build visibility of 
the small businesses that stood to be harmed by Walmart’s entry into Los Angeles Chinatown. 
The ideas and projects came together quite fluidly; in Daniel’s words, “A lot of that was organic, 
and it was obviously due to the Walmart that fueled this creativity.”235 While the issue of the 
Chinatown Walmart was the catalyst, these opportunities allowed for CCED to think creatively 
about building support in Chinatown—with small business owners and also with young people in 
Chinatown who supported CCED’s mobilization efforts. Daniel also mentioned, “I remember 
people trying a lot of different things, and was hoping that something stuck.”236 One action 
designed to raise awareness of the small businesses, for example, was a Chinatown “shopping 
cart parade” action. Another CCED event that highlighted the small businesses in Chinatown 
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was the Chinatown Cash Mob event.237 On December 9, 2012, CCED held a “cash mob” event 
in Chinatown; CCED members coordinated with small businesses in advance and brought groups 
of people to show up and buy items from their businesses for the holidays.238 
 Notably, as the campaign went on, CCED’s strategy in the Chinatown community shifted 
from the technical and legal fight to raising awareness about Walmart’s potential harm to 
existing small businesses, its unfair labor practices for its workers, and less-than-reputable role in 
global supply chains that exploited factory workers around the world. As Daniel, said, “We felt 
like, even if we couldn’t stop Walmart, we were changing the public opinion about Walmart in 
Chinatown.”239 CCED members also made broad transnational connections between the 
Chinatown Walmart campaign and workers’ issues in other places. In one instance, CCED came 
together with South Asians for Justice – Los Angeles (SAJ - LA) to hold a vigil in solidarity with 
Bangladeshi garment workers in the wake of the April 2013 Rana Plaza building collapse, which 
left over 1,000 workers dead and many more injured.240 Preeti explained how the motivations 
behind the solidarity action, which she co-organized and spoke at, emerged: 
[We were] thinking about the connection to Walmart being the predominant purchaser of 
these types of goods, and the fact that, again, that this is the largest global retailer. And 
because there are these third party factories, you can’t trace it, but they’re the ones that 
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are the biggest perpetrators of this gap. So it’s just very shady. This is the way global 
capital works. So it was very, very depressing, and so this activism, as much as it was 
about doing things, it was also about [the fact that] we have a place in calling these 
people out, and you can’t just watch it. And I did to a certain extent. We watched the 
December one [another factory fire in Bangladesh]. We watched the January one. And 
then, when the Rana Plaza factory collapse happened, with the fire and the complete 
disregard to safety regulations of buildings, the lack of exits…it was just terrible, and it 
was again this moment where people were angry. People in CCED were angry. People in 
South Asians for Justice were angry. So we had gotten together and did a vigil on the 
street corner—the same street corner that we did the grocery action, the same street 
corner that we were doing the white boards. So it was a very familiar gathering place for 
a lot of us. It was important, and if an example could be made of a potential quick 
alliance or coalition between these volunteer groups, that was one.241 
Making connections to the global supply chain in which Walmart was embedded, Preeti revealed 
the important transnational linkages that she and other members of CCED, as well as South 
Asians for Justice (SAJ – LA), were making to the Chinatown in Walmart.242 For activists like 
Preeti, the issue of the Chinatown Walmart could not only be contained to the physical space of 
Chinatown. The struggle against Walmart in Chinatown was a complex one that necessarily 
included the struggles of workers in factories that supplied the goods that corporate retailers like 
Walmart then sold, and the political vision of CCED and SAJ – LA moved towards an analysis 
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that captured these complex entanglements. Even at the regional and city scale, the Bangladeshi 
worker solidarity vigil held political significance. Preeti explained: 
A lot of us [CCED members] were connected to people in the movement. Sophia knew 
people from the Food Chain Workers Alliance, and they were talking about the 
International Labour Organization, and so we had that connection. For me, for South 
Asians for Justice, it just sort of hit that that’s what that space is for—these events that no 
non-profit would take on, or these critiques that no non-profit could take on—because to 
the non-profits in Los Angeles that provide South Asian community-based services, it’s 
completely outside the parameters of what they do.243 
The capacity to organize a solidarity vigil for the Bangladeshi factory workers symbolized not 
only a possible way in which left/progressive organizations outside of the NPIC could come 
together in coalition, it also meant that these organizations provided an important political space 
to take on a political position that other organizations could not necessarily publicly take. 
 Notably, another creative project that CCED members launched in the summer of 2013 
was a photography exhibit, titled “The Streets Between Us: Snapshots of Chinatown,” which 
featured recorded interviews with and photography by various people who lived and worked in 
Los Angeles Chinatown.244 Preeti Sharma and Stefanie Ritoper worked to conceive of the 
photography exhibit, which was designed to be participatory and inclusive of the heterogeneous 
perspectives of people who lived, worked, and played in Los Angeles Chinatown. The exhibit, 
which CCED launched at the Chinese American Museum (CAM) in July 2013, not only served 
as a way to publicize everyday stories of people in Chinatown but the program also helped 
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CCED to strengthen its working relationship with other Chinatown institutions and organizations 
like CAM. Jenny Lin, one of the CCED members that Preeti and Stefanie recruited to help with 
the photography project and exhibit, explained the origins of the creative project: 
We were talking about how to involve people in general and how they could participate. 
Traditionally, people just used data. We thought if people knew the percentage of small 
businesses that close when Walmart comes, people would be moved to action. But we 
also had to understand that what people actually cared about were stories, and that they 
wanted to share their stories. So to take a creative approach, we were thinking of all the 
ways youth talk about changes in Chinatown. Originally, one of the ideas was to have 
people take photos of what ‘their Chinatown’ looks like. We could then take those photos 
and repost them in public spaces, creating a physical map throughout the city that asked 
you to find, interact, and play with it. In that way, our goal was to change people's 
relationship to Chinatown.245 
Art and culture became a way for CCED members to engage people in Chinatown and craft 
powerful alternatives to the stories about Chinatown that were being broadcast by the business 
elite of the community (e.g., the Chinatown BID). Diane also emphasized the importance of 
CCED’s efforts to share these stories: 
You have to be able to understand and relate to what the major interests and concerns are 
in the community, and that’s by communicating with the residents and the small 
businesses. Basically, the ones that are underrepresented don’t seem to have a voice, and 
it’s important to give them a voice and make them feel that they are a part of this 
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community too. It’s not just the landowners or the developers. They’re all here in the 
same community, and what they want to see in the community is just as important.246 
Speaking of the photo exhibit, Diane noted it offered a visually compelling and powerful way of 
conveying the experiences of people who live and work in Chinatown. The photo exhibit 
telegraphed the message that CCED focused on organizing “not just actions,” in Diane’s words, 
but also focused on “the power of artistic and creative ways of representing the lives and stories 
of people in the community.”247 
CCED also sought to build an electoral strategy. On February 21, 2013, CCED hosted a 
candidates forum in Chinatown featuring contenders for the Los Angeles City Council seat for 
Council District 1.248 Working together with co-sponsors SEACA, the Asian Pacific American 
Legal Center (APALC), Nikkei for Civil Rights and Redress (NCRR), Pilipino Workers Center 
(PWC), OCA – Greater Los Angeles, and Chinatown Service Center, CCED brought the 
candidates—Jose Gardea, Gil Cedillo, Jesse Rosas, and William Morrison—to Alpine 
Recreation Center in Chinatown to field questions that various community stakeholders had.249 
 
After Walmart: Sustaining Long-Term Activism and Movement/Power Building in Chinatown 
 During the Walmart campaign, CCED rooted its strategy in a vision of a Chinatown 
community that could sustain itself and its activism long after the Walmart campaign was over. 
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As Alice discussed, the campaign against the Walmart sometimes appeared to be less about 
winning victories in the technocratic terms of, say, the Department of Building and Safety 
appeal, but rather about building power among the residents and small businesses in Chinatown: 
We had multiple strategies going at once. We knew there would be no silver bullet 
because once the paperwork was turned in and the permits were approved, we were 
working to appeal and go against something that had already gone into motion.250 
Alice’s insightful observation suggested that, although the campaign against Walmart involved 
turning out people to offer public comments at the ICO-related hearings and legal challenges to 
the City’s issuance of building permits, activists recognized it would be an uphill battle because 
Walmart had secured building permits and proceeded with construction on the Chinatown store 
even as the legal challenges were moving through the Superior Court. In addition to the bringing 
in community support around the ICO hearings and the legal challenges, CCED members began 
to imagine alternative ways to change the public perception of the Chinatown Walmart. In the 
complex calculus and analysis of CCED members like Alice, CCED recognized that “there 
would be no silver bullet” in the campaign against Walmart. Understanding the campaign as an 
urgent issue in and of itself, as well as an opportunity to organize in Chinatown, CCED activists 
engaged in “multiple strategies” of organizing and movement building in Los Angeles 
Chinatown that focused on the technical and legal battles and also emphasized building support 
in the Chinatown community. In this way, CCED members participated in imagining what 
historian Robin D. G. Kelley has called “freedom dreams”—that is, thinking of otherwise 
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possibilities and the “alternative visions and dreams that inspire new generations to continue to 
struggle for change”—that often emerge in social movements.251 
From the start, CCED focused on building the participatory leadership of its members, 
especially the younger members. This focus on building the capacity of young people to 
participate more fully in the organization helped expand CCED and its organizational capacity. 
As more young people began to pursue roles in CCED, the work took on a life of its own 
wherever the CCED members could devote their energy. For instance, Alice Tse had graduated 
in 2012 from UC Berkeley where she had become aware of left/progressive politics. Upon 
returning to Los Angeles in the months after CCED had formed, she joined the organization and 
found a new experience: 
I was nervous about joining a new space and shortly before I found out about CCED, I 
ran into José [a former high school classmate] and we had both recently returned to Los 
Angeles and were looking for jobs and wanting to get involved. So we both joined CCED 
and we started with a day-long retreat in September.252 
Discussing her facilitation skills and interests in learning more, Alice found in CCED a space to 
develop her skills and contribute in a specific role that suited her pace and capacity: 
There were always opportunities to step up, contribute, and learn new things. Folks in 
CCED were also focused on nurturing young leaders and helping us get new experiences. 
They encouraged us to build our capacity so I joined the steering committee and co-
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facilitated general meetings, which was where I could contribute best since I worked 
weekends, when much of the organizing happened.253 
The more senior organizers in CCED, especially those who had been involved in organizing in 
Los Angeles Chinatown, brought their experiences from the Asian American Movement to 
discussions about what kind of direction CCED should take as it developed as an organization 
after the anti-Walmart campaign. Phyllis and Diane both remarked on some of the differences 
between AAFE, the community organization they got involved with during the Movement, and 
CCED. Phyllis reflected on one key distinction between the two: 
The Chinatown community organization that we formed then was called AAFE—Asian 
Americans for Equality. There had been one called Asian Americans for Equal 
Employment in New York, that was the Confucius Plaza struggle. We kind of grew out 
of that and took their name. We just called it Asian Americans for Equality. Through that 
organization, we did different kinds of work in Chinatown, but through that, we met Mrs. 
Mar, Mrs. Szeto. That was more of a community organization because even Mrs. Mar to 
this day says, ‘We were a part of that organization. But CCED, we’re the cheerleaders. 
It’s the young people who are in charge and doing the work.’ We held the meetings in 
Chinese and they felt they could be a part of that. So they actually ran the organization. 
So, our CCED working meetings, the equivalent would be, we would have them in the 
meeting and they would be making the decisions and we would have the meeting in 
Chinese.254 
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Supporting Phyllis’ observation about the difference in the membership of AAFE and that of 
CCED, Diane noted the ways in which AAFE emerged more directly out of urgent issues that 
mobilized community residents more widely: 
There were more community people involved in AAFE than in CCED. I think it’s 
important to get more community people involved, but you have to have the types of 
programs that generate that interest in a sustainable way. In terms of people coming and 
going, CCED experiences the same thing that AAFE experienced of having different 
people come and go in terms of being involved. Somehow, AAFE started more with the 
residents. I think our fight to get traffic signals, those were all community people that 
wanted to do it, sort of like the Castelar campaign against the Metro charter school. It was 
community based, where people who had a personal interest in improving something in 
the community came together. So that’s why we had all these community people 
involved in AAFE. And plus, we [AAFE] were working with the garment workers and 
the restaurant workers, and they lived in Chinatown.255 
The locally grounded, personal stakes of issues like the traffic signal at an intersection where a 
child had been hit by a car, or the immediate issue of Castelar Elementary School ceding space to 
a charter school, more readily prompted local residents and parents to action. The issue of the 
Chinatown Walmart was less quick to mobilize residents, though it did prompt opposition from 
the small businesses who might potentially be hurt by Walmart’s entry. 
 
Building Coalitional Projects in the “No Walmart in Chinatown” Campaign 
 While CCED represented the activist group that was organizing people in the Chinatown 
community, it was a member of a larger coalition that came together to fight the Walmart from 
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opening in Chinatown. The formation of CCED as a grassroots activist group in Chinatown 
created new possibilities and drew attention to limitations for coalition building, particularly in 
the context of the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign. In addition to the actual coalition of 
organizations that formed to oppose Walmart in Chinatown, the formation of CCED as a visible 
left/progressive political space also contributed to bolstering a left/progressive Asian American 
political center of gravity in the landscape of Los Angeles; in doing so, CCED presented a 
left/progressive politics grounded in grassroots community organizing that telegraphed key 
political possibilities within the nonprofit industrial complex as it took form in the Asian 
American community. 
In understanding the role of the coalition and the anti-Walmart campaign, Daniel recalled 
how CCED was thinking of its sustainability even in the course of the campaign. In Daniel’s 
words, “[w]e all knew that their investment would taper off at a certain point, and we needed to 
carve out space for CCED to sustain itself.”256 The unions and organized labor—given their 
commitments to their membership—focused on strategies at the city and regional level; CCED 
complemented that work by focusing energies on on-the-ground community organizing. Where 
the organizations’ work converged in the campaign against Walmart, the coalition concentrated 
its efforts. For example, at the time of the campaign, the United Food and Commercial Workers 
Union (UFCW) Local 770 was working with the UFCW-supported OUR Walmart workers 
throughout Los Angeles, and the Chinatown Walmart offered a specific place to focus their 
organizing efforts. When it came to their relationship with CCED, the unions were able to 
dedicate their resources to the fight Walmart at the level of city politics (e.g., in the ICO 
hearings) while still supporting CCED with any resources it could provide.257 For example, the 
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labor unions provided financial and material resources in a support capacity for CCED (e.g., 
printing T-shirts, buttons, flyers, banners) and also turned out workers and union staff to various 
anti-Walmart actions, many of which took place in Chinatown during 2012 and 2013.258 APALA 
contributed by mobilizing people at the intersections of labor and the Asian American 
progressive community.259 
The coalition that came together around the issue of the Walmart Neighborhood Market 
experienced both successes and limitations. Reflecting on the unconventional convergence of 
both organized labor and community groups around the Chinatown Walmart, as well as the 
organizational dynamics within Los Angeles Chinatown, Daniel noted the challenges of creating 
coalitions: 
This is one of the unique times when a lot of people joined forces, and at that time, I was 
thinking, it’s just so hard to hold the fort down…Organizations like LAANE, the unions, 
and APALA applied resources to specific parts of the fight. That was expected. They did 
everything they were expected to do. However, when it came to the Walmart fight, we 
toiled on getting on the same page with SEACA [Southeast Asian Community 
Alliance].260 
In his comparison of SEACA and CCED, Daniel noted that there had not been enough trust built 
between both organizations—both progressive Asian American organizations based in 
Chinatown—to sustain collaboration after the Walmart campaign.261 Insofar as CCED formed 
primarily as a response to the Chinatown Walmart, the general perception in the Chinatown 
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261 “Our History,” Southeast Asian Community Alliance, http://www.seaca-la.org/about-us/.  
 103 
community was that CCED represented the “new kid on the block.”262 The perception could 
likely have been attributed to CCED’s relative age and its all volunteer membership. As a newly 
formed organization in Chinatown, CCED did not necessarily present a “track record,” so to 
speak, of accomplishments in the community that more veteran community organizations had 
established. Moreover, its all-volunteer membership likely could not match the consistency and 
labor-hours that paid staff provided established community organizations, a discrepancy that 
would have discouraged sustained organizational collaboration. Given this perception of CCED 
as a “new kid on the block,” the entry of CCED into the existing organizational and political 
landscape stirred up some organizational tension. These organizational dynamics arose in 
specific moments during the campaign against Walmart and after the formation of CCED. For 
example, in the planning for the Chinatown action on June 30, 2012, CCED was the Chinatown 
organization that the Los Angeles County Federation of Labor and unions brought into the 
planning process, while SEACA was not.263 This tension is likely attributable to the different 
organizational structures and priorities of SEACA and CCED as well as an allocation of 
capacity.264 As an organization that had been around since 2002, SEACA had spent a decade in 
Chinatown in various organizing capacities. During the campaign against Walmart in 
Chinatown, SEACA was in the midst of its own campaign around the Cornfield Arroyo Seco 
Plan (CASP), a “specific plan” that offers a detailed city planning vision and guidelines for an 
area of Lincoln Heights, Cypress Park, and Chinatown located around the Los Angeles River.265 
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When it came to the anti-Walmart campaign, SEACA’s goals and organizational priorities may 
have differed from those of CCED, and, consequently, affected the nature of the role that 
SEACA played relative to CCED in the anti-Walmart coalition. Furthermore, SEACA’s nature 
as a “more traditional” nonprofit organization that relied on a top-down structure and funding 
from foundations differed from CCED’s position as “an organizing, advocacy organization built 
on community empowerment.”266 In other words, the differences in the two organizations’ 
approaches to the Walmart campaign could be attributed to their respective organizational 
structures, accountability to funding sources, and organizing philosophies.267 Ultimately, this 
commentary on the dynamic between SEACA and CCED does not mean that the two 
organizations did not work well together. In fact, there were informal exchanges and 
interpersonal relationships between the organizations in addition to the collaboration of the two 
organizations in the anti-Walmart coalition. Additionally, staff and youth participants in SEACA 
would often join CCED members in organizing efforts around the Walmart, including the Friday 
night vigils.268  
 The formation of CCED as a left/progressive grassroots activist space also had an impact 
on building a left/progressive Asian American network in Los Angeles. CCED’s role in the anti-
Walmart campaign helped to bring the issue into the national spotlight when Lisa Lei brought an 
anti-Walmart stance to her internship in Washington, D.C., in the summer of 2013. Lei had 
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supported CCED’s organizing efforts in Chinatown as an undergraduate student at the University 
of California, Irvine, during the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign. During her internship 
for OCA, a prominent Asian American civil rights organization, Lei and two other interns shared 
a video on social media “of themselves making a rude gesture about Walmart.”269 When OCA 
staff learned of the video, they dismissed the three interns. The dismissal of the interns made 
national headlines and resurfaced concerns about the close relationships between established 
civil rights organizations and corporate interests including Walmart, Southwest, and Philip 
Morris.270 
 Comparably, CCED connected with workers and organizers around and outside of Los 
Angeles. The emergence of CCED in early 2012 coincided approximately with the emergence of 
the Organization United for Respect at Walmart (OUR Walmart), an advocacy group composed 
of Walmart employees that was initially supported financially by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union (UFCW).271 In late 2012, OUR Walmart made headlines with the 
largest action it had coordinated to date at the time: a nation-wide coordination of anti-Walmart 
protests on Black Friday.272 In 2012, CCED and OUR Walmart worked together for various 
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organization efforts and actions. In October 2012, CCED members met with workers and 
organizers from the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and one of their 
affiliates, South Africa Commercial, Catering, and Allied Workers Union (SACCAWU), to 
discuss worker organizing against Walmart in South Africa.273  In June 2013, CCED co-
sponsored a worker solidarity panel and discussion at the UCLA Labor Center that featured 
representatives from the Bangladesh Centre for Worker Solidarity, which was involved in 
organizing and supporting workers in Bangladesh, and providing support to workers in the wake 
of the April 2013 factory collapse and fire in Bangladesh.274  
 
Conclusion 
 CCED formed as an organization in 2012, but it by no means came about unexpectedly. 
In fact, the grassroots activist organization had its roots in the Asian American Movement 
organizing of the 1960s and 1970s, the activism of Asian American organizers who had already 
been thinking of ways to engage their communities in Los Angeles, and a new generation of 
college students and graduates who had been politicized through student organizing and ethnic 
studies curricula. From the beginning of the campaign against Walmart in Chinatown, CCED 
played an important role in building a broad base of support and mobilizing varying 
stakeholders, including small businesses, residents, college students, teachers, young people, and 
progressive allies, to voice opposition to the Walmart. In the campaign against Walmart, 
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CCED’s organic and experimental approach to organizing tactics and strategy became its 
signature trait: CCED as a grassroots volunteer organization unconstrained by 501(c)3 status 
could try what no other community organization dared. In doing so, and planning creative 
projects like the photography exhibit, CCED pushed the envelope for activism, so to speak. 
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Conclusion 
Los Angeles Chinatown After & Beyond Walmart 
 
From the beginning of its campaign against Wal-Mart, CCED members realized that it 
was not enough to mobilize people against oppression but to also help people envision an 
alternative Chinatown based on equity, justice, and respect for the rights of all people. 
Beginning with its campaign against Wal-Mart and continuing into its current work 
protecting tenant rights, CCED members are creating spaces in Chinatown where 
people’s lives and human dignity matter more than corporate profits or property 
values.275 
—Glenn Omatsu 
 
The tradition of the oppressed teaches us that the ‘state of emergency’ in which we live is 
not the exception but the rule.276 
—Walter Benjamin 
 
 Writing of grassroots activist organizations like Chinatown Community for Equitable 
Development (CCED), Glenn Omatsu noted that “today’s movements do not organize people to 
‘demand more’ or focus on gaining material wealth to live comfortable lives, but are focused on 
building community and human relationships around values that reject the forces of militarism 
and materialism that dehumanize people and destroy communities.”277 This research began with 
a question about the origin story of a grassroots Asian American activist organization in Los 
Angeles Chinatown. This origin story was one I wondered often about and only heard bits and 
pieces of, as I had joined Chinatown Community for Equitable Development (CCED) at the tail 
end of the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign in June 2013. In the last few months of the 
campaign, leading up to the date when the Chinatown Neighborhood Market officially opened, I 
met and learned from Chinatown residents and activists, young and old, who demonstrated a 
strong commitment to the community and neighborhood, and who conveyed a strong sense of 
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left/progressive politics, too. I learned what it was like to work in an intergenerational 
organization committed to building power. I also learned from activists who—to this day—
embody the value that Glenn Omatsu has called militant humility.278 Over time, I became 
increasingly curious about the ways in which the “No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign had 
informed the existing dynamics and relationships of the organization, both internally between 
members and externally with other people outside of CCED. I learned about the impressive 
activism and community-labor coalition that had come together partly as a response to the 
Chinatown Walmart, and partly in response to a desire to create a space for Chinese American 
activists. This MA thesis was intended to better understand some of the dimensions of the “No 
Walmart in Chinatown” campaign, and to draw lessons from this campaign that might potentially 
be applied in present and future work. 
Chinatown existed before Walmart, and it continues to exist after Walmart. When 
Walmart shuttered its doors with two days’ notice in January 2016, two and a half years after it 
had opened in Chinatown, the announcement came relatively quickly and caught many people by 
surprise.279 By then, some of the changes that activists and community members had been 
concerned about had already arrived: a new luxury apartment complex (Jia Apartments) had 
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already opened, and Far East Plaza was quickly taking on its reputation as home to trendy 
restaurants like Roy Choi’s Chego! and Ramen Champ.280 
Thinking back to the atmosphere of the anti-Walmart campaign and how CCED 
approached the fight, Alice remembered, “It felt like we had to hold the line because a Walmart 
opening would set a dangerous precedent and would lead to more challenges.”281 Even three 
years after the Walmart campaign concluded in the fall of 2013, at the time of the writing of this 
thesis, CCED has gone through many discussions around what kind of organization it wants to 
be. Since it first coalesced around the urgency of the proposed Walmart in Chinatown, CCED 
has developed by-laws and a committee structure that provides organization and permits 
participatory leadership from its volunteer members. Since the conclusion of the “No Walmart in 
Chinatown” campaign, CCED has shifted its work to focus on tenant organizing and housing 
rights work in and around Los Angeles Chinatown. Discussions and questions among CCED 
members regarding the direction of the organization, even as it expands and shifts its work 
priorities, arise periodically. As Phyllis astutely noted: 
For CCED now, one of the big questions is going to be…what kind of organization 
should it be? Should it be an activist core, or a community mass organization? [AAFE] 
was a mass organization, meaning that half the members were community members and 
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not active young people who could speak English and stuff. It’ll be interesting where 
CCED goes, because we never have an issue getting people to come and participate in 
things. Most of the people we can get to stay on, activists. There’s a lot of students who 
graduate, different life issues happen, people cycle in and out. I’m not sure about the 
future—that to me is a very interesting question. What will CCED actually become?282 
Even as CCED has been grappling with a question of its organizational identity, it has also been 
focusing its efforts on organizing around various conditions in Chinatown. As Craig noted in an 
email, “We’ll have to see how our organizing goes and what conditions develop in Chinatown. 
It’s a grand experiment.”283 
This thesis reflects on the various narratives in the campaign against the Walmart 
Neighborhood Market in Los Angeles Chinatown. The media narratives constructed during the 
“No Walmart in Chinatown” campaign focused on dominant portrayals of Chinatown as a food 
desert and interpreted the controversy as one between organized labor and big business. The anti-
Walmart coalition responded with counter-narratives that centered existing small businesses in 
Chinatown and grounded the narrative in local terms. In addition, the city and legal archives 
documented limited narratives of the campaign that focused on the interim control ordinance and 
various legal challenges involving Walmart’s building permits. Finally, the formation and 
evolution of CCED built on the legacy of Asian American Movement activism in Los Angeles 
Chinatown and also created something new. Through their relationships, political vision, and 
organizing tactics, CCED members attempted to broaden their activism at the same time that 
they built grassroots power in Los Angeles Chinatown. 
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